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The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in
State Competition for Businesses
Hayes R. Holdernesst
Competition among the states for mobile firms and the jobs and infrastructure
they can bring is a well-known phenomenon. However, in recent years, a handful of
states have added a mysterious new tool to their kit of incentives used in this com-
petition. Unlike more traditional incentives, these new incentives-which this
Article brands "customer-based incentives'L-offer tax relief to a firm's customers
rather than directly to the firm. The puzzle underlying customer-based incentives is
that tax relief provided to the firm's customers would seem more difficult for the firm
to capture than relief provided directly to the firm-strange, as a state's primary
goal is to subsidize the firm's investment in the state.
After examining the emergence of this new form of incentive, this Article offers
a novel explanation for its use and potential for success. Specifically, the Article
argues that the effects of predictable consumer biases, particularly with respect to
the salience of the tax relief provided by the incentives to consumers, cause customer-
based incentives to differ substantively from traditional incentives in ways that are
beneficial to both firms and states. Customer-based incentives thus present an ex-
ample of how taxpayer behavior can influence the substantive effects of tax provi-
sions, even causing two provisions with the same goal to differ on the ground. Taking
these behavioral effects into account provides opportunities to increase the effective-
ness of tax provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Amazon agreed to invest $130 million in building
two fulfillment centers and to create 1,500 jobs in New Jersey in
exchange for the state relieving Amazon of its sales-tax-collection
obligations.' That New Jersey took action to lure Amazon into the
state is unexceptional; states have long competed with each other
over mobile firms by providing specific firms with targeted eco-
nomic development incentives to encourage those firms to invest
in the states.2 Until very recently, however, few, if any, states had
provided such incentives in the form that New Jersey provided to
Amazon,3 a form that this Article labels "customer-based" incen-
tives. Instead, targeted economic development incentives have
1 See John Buhl, New Jersey Governor, Amazon Reach Collection Agreement, 64
State Tax Notes 676, 676 (2012).
2 See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Con-
straints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv L Rev 377, 382-84 (1996) (offering
a brief history of state economic development incentives).
3 See generally Billy Hamilton, Amazon's "Dirty Little Secret", 72 State Tax Notes
531 (2014); Amy Hamilton, Connecticut Governor Announces Deal with Amazon, State Tax
Today 24-4 (Feb 5, 2013); Neil Downing, Massachusetts Governor, Amazon Announce Sales
Tax Collection Deal, State Tax Today 239-7 (Dec 12, 2012); Billy Hamilton, What an
Amazon Sales Tax Deal Looks Like, 65 State Tax Notes 675 (2012); John Buhl, Texas An-
nounces Tax Collection Deal with Amazon, 64 State Tax Notes 351 (2012); John Buhl,
Amazon Reaches Tax Deal with Nevada, Negotiating with Texas, 64 State Tax Notes 273
(2012); John Buhl, Virginia Governor Approves Amazon Sales Tax Deal, 64 State Tax
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traditionally taken the form of such things as income tax credits
and property tax abatements.4 For example, in 2013, New Jersey's
close neighbor Maryland provided Amazon with $43 million worth
of tax credits in exchange for Amazon's opening a one-million-
square-foot distribution center and employing one thousand peo-
ple in the state.5 Though "traditional incentives" like those pro-
vided by Maryland are unremarkable, customer-based incentives
are anything but.
This Article introduces customer-based incentives to the aca-
demic literature by arguing for their remarkability and their
place in states' efforts to lure mobile firms and the jobs and infra-
structure they bring. After providing an overview of how
customer-based incentives function and the apparent oddity of
their use, I argue that predictable consumer biases cause individ-
uals to react to customer-based incentives in ways that make
those incentives more effective at luring firms to the offering state
and more beneficial to society as a whole than traditional incen-
tives. This conclusion explains why the emergence of customer-
based incentives is not so odd after all and, at a higher level,
demonstrates that the form of a tax provision can affect its sub-
stantive consequences; policymakers can improve the efficiency
and equity of tax provisions, particularly tax relief provisions, by
incorporating the lessons of behavioral research into the design of
those provisions.6
Customer-based incentives and traditional incentives repre-
sent two ways a state can achieve the substantive policy of
encouraging a particular firm to invest in the state. Through tra-
ditional incentives, the state provides the firm with direct tax
relief;7 through customer-based incentives, the state provides tax
Notes 85 (2012); Tom Humphrey, Tennessee Governor Approves Amazon Collection Exemp-
tion, 64 State Tax Notes 9 (2012); John Buhl, Indiana Governor: Amazon Will Collect Sales
Tax, 63 State Tax Notes 191 (2012); Simon Brown, South Carolina Sales Tax Collection
Exemption for Amazon Becomes Law, State Tax Today 111-40 (June 9, 2011).
4 See Enrich, 110 Harv L Rev at 382-84 (cited in note 2).
5 Luke Broadwater, Amazon's Baltimore Site to Receive More than $43M in Tax
Credits (Baltimore Sun, Oct 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2PRE-BHUW.
6 Professor Edward J. McCaffery is a pioneer of this line of thinking about taxes and
has argued that taxpayer behavior should be expected to affect tax systems. See Edward
J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L Rev 1861, 1867-68 (1994). This Article
builds on his and others' early works by focusing on how consumer biases affect the sub-
stantive impact of tax relief provisions. See generally id.
7 See James K. Smith, Use of Business Tax Incentives: Part 1, 17 J State Taxn 1, 9-
15 (1999); Kathryn A. Pischak, State Economic Development Incentives: What's Available?
What Works?, 8 J State Taxn 191, 192 (1989).
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relief to the firm's customers when they transact with the firm.8
The difference between customer-based incentives and tradi-
tional incentives may appear irrelevant when actors are econom-
ically rational; a firm can adjust its prices to capture as much of
the tax relief provided through either form of incentive as it pre-
fers.9 Further, when one relaxes the assumption of rational
actors, there also seems to be a real danger to Amazon or any
similarly situated firm that it would not be able to capture the tax
relief from customer-based incentives; its customers might not
tolerate the firm raising pretax prices to capture the relief. Re-
search into consumers' perceptions of fairness in pricing confirms
the likelihood of this result; thus, the tax relief from customer-
based incentives should be expected to stick with customers, at
least to some degree.10 Thus, the emergence of customer-based
incentives is somewhat mysterious; why break from the status
quo of traditional incentives in favor of what appears to be a less
firm-friendly form of incentive?
The effects of tax salience on consumer behavior provide an
answer to this mystery. Tax salience refers to the level of aware-
ness taxpayers have of a tax provision." Thus, when a consumer
wants to spend $1,000 on a new laptop from Amazon but the
additional $60 of sales tax stops her from doing so, that sales tax
is salient to her. Research into tax salience demonstrates that
many tax provisions-particularly sales taxes-may be "under-
salient" to consumers; consumers ignore these taxes to some
degree.12 Returning to. that same consumer, when the sales tax is
undersalient to her, she might completely ignore that $60 of sales
tax and purchase the laptop anyway, even though she ultimately
spends $1,060 and exceeds her preferred budget. Other tax provi-
sions can be "hypersalient" to consumers, meaning that consum-
ers overreact economically to the provisions.13 The laptop pur-
chaser might perceive a hypersalient sales tax as the economic
equivalent of $120 instead of $60, making her even less likely to
8 See Part IA.
9 See Part II.
10 See Part ILA.
11 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale
J Reg 253, 261-62 (2011); David Gamage and Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Sali-
ence: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 Tax L Rev 19, 23 (2011); Brian Galle,
Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash U L Rev 59, 62 (2009).
12 See, for example, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxa-
tion: Theory and Evidence, 99 Am Econ Rev 1145, 1165 (2009).
13 Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduc-
tion to Hypersalience, 92 BU L Rev 1307, 1317 (2012).
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purchase the laptop. However, if tax relief can be made hyper-
salient to consumers, then they will overreact to its economic
value; $60 of sales tax relief might feel like $120 to the laptop
purchaser, causing her great satisfaction when purchasing from
a firm receiving customer-based incentives, such as Amazon.
Hypersalience of the tax relief from customer-based incen-
tives may seem outlandish at first; however, consumers' behav-
ioral biases make it not only feasible but likely. For instance,
research has demonstrated that people suffer from a behavior
termed "tax-label aversion"-people value not paying something
labeled a tax just for the mere fact that it is labeled a tax. 14 Be-
cause customer-based incentives offer consumers tax relief, those
incentives trigger consumers' tax-label aversion. Therefore, a
firm receiving customer-based incentives can promote sales-tax-
free shopping and expect a bump in demand because people
simply do not like taxes. 15 Traditional incentives do not offer this
advantage because consumers are unlikely to think they are be-
ing relieved of taxes, even if the firm lowers prices to pass along
the tax relief from traditional incentives. This suggests that,
when it can invoke tax-label aversion in its customers, a firm can
get more of a benefit from customer-based incentives than tradi-
tional incentives, explaining why Amazon would request customer-
based incentives.16
Any hypersalient tax relief provided through customer-based
incentives should be expected to benefit not only firms but also
states, further explaining the emergence of customer-based incen-
tives. Customer-based incentives are likely to generate more ben-
efits for society than traditional incentives, all else being equal.
These societal benefits result primarily from two sources. First,
because of tax-label aversion, consumers feel more satisfaction
when shopping at a firm receiving customer-based incentives
than they would otherwise.17 Second, because a firm receiving
customer-based incentives is less likely to capture the tax relief
14 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 49-50 (cited in note 11).
15 See Abigail B. Sussman and Christopher Y. Olivola, Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Dis-
liked More Than Equivalent Costs, 48 J Mktg Rsrch S91, S100 (2011).
16 Reports indicate that Amazon has been the initial party proposing the customer-
based incentives. See John Buhl, Amazon Seeking New Jersey Tax Collection Exemption,
63 State Tax Notes 511, 511 (2012); John Buhl, Amazon Offers Florida Jobs in Exchange
for Collection Break, 63 State Tax Notes 360, 360 (2012); John Buhl, Amazon Reportedly
Seeking Sales Tax Collection Exemption from South Carolina, State Tax Today 41-20 (Mar
2, 2011); Amy Hamilton, Amazon Proposes Deal in California, State Tax Today 171-4 (Sept
2, 2011).
17 See Part III.B.
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offered than a firm receiving traditional incentives, customer-
based incentives are more likely than traditional incentives to
undo the harmful effects to society of the original taxes. 18 Taxes
reduce the amount of beneficial transactions in a society and
thereby reduce overall social welfare. When customers retain the
tax relief provided by the state, it is as though the original taxes
were never imposed; society is restored to a pretax world. If the
firm retains the tax relief, as can be expected to happen in the
case of traditional incentives, society remains in the after-tax
world and the harmful effects of taxation are not eliminated.19
States have additional reasons to potentially prefer customer-
based incentives. A common concern regarding traditional incen-
tives is the fear of the tax relief being used to finance activities
outside of the state-that the money the state lays out will some-
how "escape" the state by the firm's actions.20 Because the tax
relief provided by customer-based incentives is directly tied to in-
state consumption, those incentives are not plagued by the escape
issue.21 Also, customer-based incentives provide tax relief-even
if only nominally-to anyone willing to shop from the recipient
firm, which may make customer-based incentives more equitable
in public opinion.22 However, certain customer-based incentives
involve a form of selective nonenforcement of taxes by the state
that may be perceived as particularly unfair and politically unde-
sirable (though the states' current experiences should soften this
concern).23 Customer-based incentives may further increase social
welfare if they are perceived as more equitable and less subject to
abuse than traditional incentives, but, at a minimum, these addi-
tional aspects of customer-based incentives further demonstrate
how such incentives can differ from traditional incentives.
In sum, the goals of this Article are twofold: first, to introduce
customer-based incentives to the academic literature; and second,
to use those incentives to demonstrate that the form of a tax pro-
vision can affect its substantive consequences. To these ends, the
Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I details the different forms of
targeted economic development incentives, providing an in-depth
look at how customer-based incentives function and describing
18 See Part IV.A.
19 See Part W.A.
20 See Part IV.B.
21 See Part IVB.
22 See Part I.C.
23 See Part I.C.
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their recent emergence and potential for growth. Part II then
questions the puzzling emergence of customer-based incentives,
the benefits of which appear more difficult for a firm to capture
than those arising from traditional incentives. Part III offers a
solution to this puzzle: the salience of the tax relief from the two
different forms of incentives affects the benefits they produce for
firms in ways that make customer-based incentives more appeal-
ing than traditional incentives. Part IV then examines the poten-
tial benefits of customer-based incentives to states, providing a
basis for why a state would prefer customer-based incentives to
traditional incentives as a matter of policy.
I. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF TARGETED ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
Targeted economic development incentives have long been a
part of state government spending, as states compete for mobile
firms and the jobs and infrastructure they bring.24 This Part pro-
vides a brief overview of such incentives before narrowing its
focus to customer-based incentives. Traditionally, targeted eco-
nomic development incentives have provided specific firms with
direct tax relief through such things as income tax credits and
property tax abatements, like Maryland provided to Amazon,25 or
with subsidies through such things as state-sponsored job train-
ing programs and infrastructure construction.26 In exchange, the
state offering the incentives often hopes to bring (or retain) jobs,
investment in infrastructure, and economic growth to the state,
24 See Randle B. Pollard, "Was the Deal Worth It?": The Dilemma of States with Inef-
fective Economic Incentives Programs, 11 Hastings Bus L J 1, 3-8 (2015) (offering a history
of state economic development incentives); Enrich, 110 Harv L Rev at 382-89 (cited in
note 2). States also have a history of providing general economic development incentives,
which are incentives available to all who meet certain criteria, such as performing partic-
ular levels of manufacturing in the state. See Pischak, 8 J State Taxn at 192-93 (cited in
note 7).
25 See Broadwater, Amazon's Baltimore Site (cited in note 5).
26 See Pollard, 11 Hastings Bus L J at 8-12 (cited in note 24); Kirk J. Stark and
Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know about the Interstate Economic Effects of State Tax
Incentives?, 4 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 133, 137-41 (2006); Daniel P. Petrov, Note, Pris-
oners No More: State Investment Relocation Incentives and the Prisoners' Dilemma, 33
Case W Reserve J Intl L 71, 72 (2001); Steven R. Little, Comment, Corporate Welfare Wars:
The Insufficiency of Current Constraints on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal
Legislative Response, 22 Hamline L Rev 849, 855-56 (1999); Smith, 17 J State Taxn at 9-
15 (cited in note 7); Pischak, 8 J State Taxn at 192 (cited in note 7).
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along with the additional tax revenues that accompany such
things.27
This Article focuses on targeted economic development incen-
tives providing tax relief. The overarching ability of such incen-
tives to influence mobile firms' decisions is the topic of much
debate,28 which I do not enter. The fact remains that most, if not
all, states offer targeted economic development incentives.
Though many commentators conclude that the incentives' impact
on firms' decisions is relatively small, they tend to admit that
states offer the incentives anyway due to the perceived high-
stakes competition for jobs and other drivers of economic growth.29
Targeted economic development incentives providing tax relief
can take a number of forms. Traditional incentives are relatively
uncomplicated; through them, the state provides direct tax relief
to the firm, and the firm is then free to take advantage of that tax
relief however it prefers.30 In contrast, customer-based incentives
do not provide direct tax relief to the firm but instead provide tax
relief to the firm's customers.
The remainder of this Part details customer-based incentives
more closely by first examining how they function and then inspect-
ing their recent emergence. Though customer-based incentives
27 See Pollard, 11 Hastings Bus L J at 13 (cited in note 24); Dale A. Oesterle, State
and Local Government Subsidies for Businesses: A Siren's Trap, 6 Ohio St Entrepreneurial
Bus L J 491, 494 (2011); Zachary A. Phelps, Note, Stadium Construction for Professional
Sports: Reversing the Inequities through Tax Incentives, 18 St John's J Legal Commen 981,
1011 (2004); Sherry L. Jarrell, Gary Shoesmith, and J. Neal Robbins, Law and Economics
of Regulating Local Economic Development Incentives, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 805, 822
(2006); Petrov, Note, 33 Case W Reserve J Intl L at 72-73 (cited in note 26); Matthew
Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a Prisoner's Dilemma:
The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the Appropriateness of a Federal
Legislative Response, 28 NM L Rev 303, 308 (1998); Smith, 17 J State Taxn at 17-18 (cited
in note 7); Kimberly Galligan Key and James K. Smith, Trends in State and Local
Economic Development Incentives, 15 J State Taxn 1, 2-3 (1996); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Primary Tax Incentives for Industrial Investment in the Southeastern United States, 25
Emory L J 789, 794-95 (1976).
28 See, for example, Oesterle, 6 Ohio St Entrepreneurial Bus L J at 495-96 (cited in
note 27) (noting skepticism about the effectiveness of economic development incentives);
Petrov, Note, 33 Case W Reserve J Intl L at 77-79 (cited in note 26) (detailing the debate
over the effectiveness of economic development incentives); Schaefer, 28 NM L Rev at 309-
11 (cited in note 27) (same); Smith, 17 J State Taxn at 15-21 (cited in note 7) (same).
29 See James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: Much Ado
about Nothing?, 4 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 101, 105-07 (2006); Petrov, Note, 33 Case W
Reserve J Intl L at 79-83 (cited in note 26); Schaefer, 28 NM L Rev at 311-12 (cited in
note 27); Enrich, 110 Harv L Rev at 391-97 (cited in note 2); James R. Rogers, State Tax
Competition and Congressional Commerce Power: The Original Prudence of Concurrent
Taxing Authority, 7 Regent U L Rev 103, 108-13 (1996).
30 See text accompanying note 26.
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are not necessarily limited to the area of sales taxes, the discus-
sion will focus on sales-tax-based, customer-based incentives
given that these are the only type of customer-based incentives
provided by states so far. For these purposes, there are no mean-
ingful differences between how a state imposes its sales tax or
between sales taxes and use taxes.31 Therefore, for ease of discus-
sion, all sales taxes and use taxes will collectively be referred to
as "sales taxes."
A. How Customer-Based Incentives Work
Understanding how customer-based incentives operate pro-
vides the necessary background for considering how they differ
from traditional incentives. There are three parties directly in-
volved in the provision of a customer-based incentive: the state,
the firm, and the firm's customers.32 The state provides the
customer-based incentive, the firm receives the customer-based
incentive, and the firm's customers are relieved of their obligation
to pay taxes on purchases from the firm. This tax relief for the
31 States impose sales taxes on sales of taxable property and services. See, for exam-
ple, Cal Rev & Tax Code § 6051; NY Tax Law § 1105; Tex Tax Code Ann § 151.051; Wis
Stat § 77.52. Some states impose their sales taxes directly on consumers; others impose
the taxes directly on vendors. Compare NY Tax Law § 1133 (imposing liability for the tax
on the consumer) and 20 NYCRR § 525.2(a)(4) (explaining the nature of the sales tax as a
"consumer tax"), with Cal Rev & Tax Code § 6051 (imposing liability for the tax on the
vendor). In either case, vendors are required or permitted to collect sales taxes from their
customers at the point of sale; if a vendor fails to do so, it becomes legally responsible for
the uncollected taxes if it was not already so responsible. See, for example, Cal Civ Code
§ 1656.1; Fla Stat § 212.07; NY Tax Law § 1131(1); NC Gen Stat § 105-164.8; Tex Tax Code
Ann § 151.052; Utah Code Ann § 59-12-107(2)(a).
Additionally, states impose use taxes on goods legally subject to sales tax but on which
sales tax was not paid. See Richard D. Pomp, State & Local Taxation at 6-40 to -42 (Richard
D. Pomp 8th ed 2015). This situation might occur when a consumer purchases a good that
would have been taxable in her home state in a sales-tax-free state, such as Delaware, and
then brings the good back home for use. See id at 6-39. Use taxes are imposed on the
consumer, but states allow credits against their use taxes for sales taxes properly paid to
other jurisdictions on the sale of taxable goods in order to prevent double taxation of the
goods. See id. As with sales taxes, vendors are required to collect use taxes at the point of
sale. See, for example, Cal Rev & Tax Code § 6203; Fla Stat § 212.07; NY Tax Law
§ 1131(1); NC Gen Stat § 105-164.8; Tex Tax Code Ann § 151.103; Utah Code Ann § 59-12-
107(2)(a). Given that sales and use taxes are imposed on a transaction-by-transaction
basis, the vendor-collection scheme is viewed as the most administratively effective
approach to collecting the taxes. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction:
An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 38 Ga L Rev 343, 345 (2003)
("As between collecting tax from each individual consumer or from the seller, it is more
administratively practical to collect the tax from the seller.").
32 From a representative-government perspective, the state is largely an agent of the
customers, but because state actors can have independent motivations and some customers
may not also be voters, the state and the customers are approached here as separate parties.
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firm's customers is the defining attribute of a customer-based in-
centive, and it can conceivably take two forms: direct relief of the
taxes imposed on purchases from the firm, and indirect relief from
taxes. Customer-based incentives providing the former will be
referred to as "direct customer-based incentives," and those
providing the latter as "indirect customer-based incentives." The
primary benefits of customer-based incentives-direct or indi-
rect-to the firm are straightforward. Beyond the administrative
cost savings that come with not having to collect sales taxes, 33 the
firm receives the competitive advantage of being physically pre-
sent in the state34 and its customers not having to pay sales taxes
on their purchases from it.a This competitive advantage may re-
sult in both more customers and more profits per customer if the
33 All else being equal between traditional incentives and customer-based incentives,
these administrative savings should cause a firm that does not currently have a physical
presence in the taxing state to prefer customer-based incentives, as the firm will thus be
able to continue with its status quo position of not collecting sales taxes in the state even
though it would have a physical presence in the state. Many thanks to Dhammika
Dharmapala for raising this point. A corollary to this point is that a firm experiencing the
benefits of not collecting taxes because it lacks a physical presence in the offering state,
see note 34, would prefer to retain those benefits upon entering the state, making
customer-based incentives more appealing than traditional incentives.
34 Under Supreme Court precedent, a vendor must have a physical presence in a
state before that state may require it to collect or pay sales tax. See Quill Corp v North
Dakota, 504 US 298, 317 (1992). The boundaries of what constitutes a physical presence
in a state are not completely clear, though the Supreme Court has declared that the fur-
thest extension of the concept has been to attribute to an out-of-state vendor the in-state
presence of a person acting on the vendor's behalf to establish or maintain a market for
the vendor in the state. See id at 306. See also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc v Washington
State Department of Revenue, 483 US 232, 249-50 (1987); Scripto, Inc v Carson, 362 US
207, 209-11 (1960). In the absence of additional guidance, the states have introduced var-
ious standards outlining their views of the limits of the physical-presence standard. See
Pomp, State & Local Taxation at 9-71 to -74 (cited in note 31).
35 See Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Jacob R. Thornock, and Braden M. Williams, Does Use Tax
Evasion Provide a Competitive Advantage to E-tailers?, 69 Natl Tax J 133, 163-64 (2016)
(summarizing evidence regarding the competitive advantage gained by online vendors
who do not have to collect sales taxes); Liran Einav, et al, Sales Taxes and Internet Com-
merce, 104 Am Econ Rev 1, 3 (2014) ("We estimate that on average, the application of a 10
percent sales tax [on the vendor] reduces purchases by 15 percent among [eBay] buyers
who have clicked on an item."); Yu Jeffrey Hu and Zhulei Tang, The Impact of Sales Tax
on Internet and Catalog Sales: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 32 Intl J Indust Org
84, 90 (2014) (providing empirical support for the conclusion that "a change in sales tax
has a highly significant and large effect on remote sales through the internet and catalog
channels"); Brian Baugh, Itzhak Ben-David, and Hoonsuk Park, Can Taxes Shape an
Industry? Evidence from the Implementation of the 'Amazon Tax" *24 (Fisher College of
Business Working Paper No 2014-03-05, Sept 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/RUG5
-U9NG (demonstrating that consumers prefer to make purchases from firms that do not
collect sales taxes); Eric T. Anderson, et al, How Sales Taxes Affect Customer and Firm
Behavior: The Role of Search on the Internet, 47 J Mktg Rsrch 229, 239 (2010) (finding that
an obligation to collect sales taxes decreases Internet orders from a retailer by 11.6 percent,
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firm also raises its pretax prices to capture some of the tax relief
offered by the incentives.
Direct customer-based incentives are rare, if not nonexistent.
Such incentives presumably would be provided through statutory
or regulatory language exempting purchases from a certain firm
from sales taxes. 36 In this scenario, there would be no sales tax
owed on transactions with the firm, so the firm would not collect
any taxes. Though direct customer-based incentives are rare,
direct relief of sales taxes is not a foreign concept; such relief can
be found in the statutes of all of the forty-five states (and the
District of Columbia) that impose sales taxes. For example, ex-
emptions for or lower tax rates on purchases of groceries,37 pur-
chases from nonprofit organizations,38 or purchases in designated
enterprise zones 39 all provide direct tax relief to consumers.
Though the goals of these exemptions may not always be eco-
nomic development, they encourage consumers to buy groceries
instead of restaurant meals, to buy from nonprofit instead of for-
profit organizations, and to shop in enterprise zones instead of
outside the zones. Enterprise zones-designated areas in which a
state lowers tax rates and business regulations in an effort to
stimulate economic growth and employment40-offer a good exam-
ple of direct tax relief for economic development purposes that di-
rect customer-based incentives might imitate in a more targeted
way. Indeed, enterprise zones provide a possible starting point
though finding no similar effect on catalog orders); Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who
Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 Natl Tax J 251,
254 (2008) (describing the benefit of a firm not remitting taxes when its competitors do
remit).
36 Such language directly providing the benefit to the firm might be unconstitutional
in many states in which tax laws are required to apply to all people equally, so some cre-
ative drafting might be required. For an example of such creativity, see SC Code Ann § 12-
36-2691 (providing indirect customer-based incentives to Amazon without nominally sin-
gling out Amazon). See also Clif LeBlanc, House OKs Amazon Deal (The State, May 18,
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/WU3N-7X5V (documenting the conclusion of tax incen-
tive negotiations between Amazon and South Carolina lawmakers, which were focused on
job creation and investment targets).
37 See, for example, 35 ILCS 120/2-5(35-5) (imposing a lower tax rate than the general
tax rate on "food for human consumption that is to be consumed off the premises where it
is sold").
38 See, for example, Ind Code § 6-2.5-5-26 (providing exemptions for certain sales by
nonprofit organizations).
39 See, for example, NJ Rev Stat § 52:27H-80 (providing an exemption from half of
the tax for sales by qualifying businesses located in a designated enterprise zone).
40 See Kyle R. Williams, Note, State Tax Credits for Private Start- Up Capital: Arching
toward Urban "Entrepreneurial Redevelopment", 6 Wash U J L & Pol 299, 315 (2001); Smith,
17 J State Taxn at 12 (cited in note 7); Pischak, 8 J State Taxn at 194 (cited in note 7).
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from which direct customer-based incentives might evolve should
states desire to venture into offering such incentives.41
In contrast, a state provides indirect customer-based incen-
tives by relieving the firm of its obligation to collect sales taxes.
Thus, the state does not formally relieve the firm's customers of
their obligations to pay sales taxes (the taxes are still owed), but
instead the firm never collects the taxes, effectively relieving the
customers of the taxes. This effective tax relief arises because
individual compliance with sales tax obligations-technically, use
tax obligations-is dismally low when a vendor does not collect
the taxes at the time of sale, and the states' efforts to overcome
this low level of compliance have been largely ineffective.42 Thus,
in the current state of affairs, if a vendor does not collect sales tax
from an individual, the sales tax will not be paid; relieving firms
of their sales-tax-collection obligations results in sales tax relief
for their customers.
Though indirect customer-based incentives are a new phe-
nomenon, most consumers have enjoyed a form of indirect tax
relief for some time. Under Supreme Court precedent, remote
vendors-vendors without a physical presence in the taxing state,
such as online and mail-order vendors-are beyond the states'
41 In addition, the insights gained from the study of customer-based incentives may
help policymakers craft more effective enterprise zones, specifically if future enterprise
zones are able to harness the potential benefits created by consumer behaviors discussed
in this Article. Research on the effectiveness of enterprise zones finds that the zones often
struggle to meet their goals. See, for example, David Neumark and Jed Kolko, Do Enter-
prise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California's Enterprise Zone Program, 68 J Urban
Econ 1, 15 (2010) (concluding that California's enterprise zones failed to increase employ-
ment); Joel A. Elvery, The Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment: An Eval-
uation of the Enterprise Zone Programs of California and Florida, 23 Econ Development
Q 44, 57 (2009) (concluding that enterprise zones in California and Florida had no signif-
icant effect on employment); Stephen Billings, Do Enterprise Zones Work? An Analysis at
the Borders, 37 Pub Fin Rev 68, 89 (2009) (finding that Colorado's enterprise zones had
insignificant impacts on firms' location decisions but had positive impacts for job creation).
42 See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States *10
(Minn House Rsrch Department, April 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/J4W3-UGM6
(noting that the percentage of taxpayers who report use tax in states in which that tax can
be reported on income-tax returns is approximately 1.9 percent). The states' inability to
collect sales taxes from consumers is grounded in administrative and political difficulties.
See Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W Va L Rev 147, 151-60 (2015); Swain, 38
Ga L Rev at 353 (cited in note 31); Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 Ga L
Rev 1, 23-24 (2003). Business consumers, as opposed to individual consumers, have higher
compliance rates with their sales tax obligations. See Thimmesch, 118 W Va L Rev at 158
(cited in note 42).
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taxing authority.43 Remote vendors do not collect sales taxes from
their customers because they are not obligated to.44 And because
individual consumers do not self-report and pay their sales taxes
on their purchases from remote vendors, the consumers receive
indirect tax relief on those purchases.45 According to one study,
43 See note 34. In addition to the physical-presence standard, which is imposed under
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause also
places limits on the states' jurisdiction to tax remote vendors, though the scope of those
limitations is debated. Compare Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously:
The Give and Take of State Taxation, 20 Fla Tax Rev 371, 419-25 (2017) (arguing that the
Due Process Clause places meaningful limitations on states' abilities to tax remote ven-
dors making sales into the states), with Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution of Due Process
and State Tax Jurisdiction, 55 Santa Clara L Rev 565, 586-92 (2015) (arguing that the
Due Process Clause does not place significant limitations on states' abilities to tax remote
vendors making sales into the states).
44 Maintaining the status quo of noncollection may be a primary driver of a remote
vendor, such as Amazon, seeking customer-based incentives rather than traditional incen-
tives. See note 33.
45 The states' discontent with this result has led them to campaign against the
physical-presence standard, with little success so far. See generally, for example, Maria
Koklanaris, Governors: States Will Act on Their Own for E-Fairness, 79 State Tax Notes
119 (2016) (reporting on states' efforts to overturn Quill); Brian Bardwell, Council of State
Governments Asks Congress to Act on E-Commerce Taxation, 79 State Tax Notes 27 (2016)
(same); Jennifer DePaul, Governors Press for Passage of MFA, 75 State Tax Notes 79
(2015) (same); David Brunori, MTC Market-Based Sourcing Efforts Are Good, 78 State Tax
Notes 915 (2015) ("[I]f Congress does not act, there is a good possibility that the Supreme
Court will overturn Quill. States are getting very aggressive regarding sales tax nexus.
More litigation is coming."). See also Annette Nellen, Still Seeking Digital Direction, 78
State Tax Notes 797, 797-98 (2015) (discussing Alabama's efforts to overturn Quill); Adam
B. Thimmesch, The Fading Bright Line of Physical Presence: Did KFC Corporation v. Iowa
Department of Revenue Give States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100 Ky L J
339, 340 (2011-12) ("States have responded to these losses by aggressively and continu-
ously lobbying Congress to legislatively overturn the physical-presence rule. Despite those
efforts, however, Congress has not yet given states the reprieve that they seek."); Swain,
38 Ga L Rev at 370 (cited in note 31) ("Unfortunately, Congress has not proven to be an
effective forum for state tax reform. Ever since Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, legislation
that would 'overrule' the physical presence test has been introduced, only to flounder.").
However, even though the standard remains in place, momentum appears to be gain-
ing against it: Congress has considered legislation to overturn the standard, advocates
have called for the Supreme Court to overturn the standard, and some states have gone
so far as to adopt legislation or regulations that intentionally ignore the physical-presence
standard. See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017, S 976, 115th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 27,
2017); SD Cod Laws § 10-64-1 et seq; Ala Reg § 810-6-2-.90.03; Tenn Comp R & Regs 1320-
05-01-.129; David Brunori, It's Time to Overturn Quill, 55 State Tax Notes 497, 497-98
(2010) (advocating for the overturning of Quill); Robert D. Plattner, Quill: Ten Years After,
25 State Tax Notes 1017, 1017 (2002):
The Quill decision qualifies as a blunder of major proportions by the
Court..... [T]he states should push the Supreme Court to reexamine Quill by
bringing a new test case that seeks to change not only the outcome in Quill but
also the framework of Supreme Court decisionmaking in state tax nexus cases.
While it may be naive to think that the Court would abandon Quill, it is hard to
believe that the Supreme Court is satisfied with the anachronistic, illogical state
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consumers' failure to self-report and pay sales taxes not collected
by online vendors contributed to an estimated $11.4 billion in lost
revenues among all states in 2012.46 Anyone who has made a pur-
chase online on which sales tax was not collected and who did not
subsequently pay the tax has experienced this unintentional form
of indirect tax relief, albeit by breaking the law.
B. The Emergence of Indirect Customer-Based Incentives
Though the future of indirect sales tax relief for purchases from
remote vendors is unclear,47 indirect customer-based incentives are
emerging. This Section examines this emergence and argues that
such incentives are poised to grow in usage as a practical matter.
In recent years, a handful of states have provided Amazon with
indirect customer-based incentives by agreeing to delay the
enforcement of Amazon's sales-tax-collection obligations in ex-
change for Amazon's commitment to create and maintain a cer-
tain number of jobs in the states and to invest certain amounts in
facilities in the states. 48 The states do not appear to have provided
customer-based incentives (direct or indirect) to any firm other
of constitutional doctrine embodied in Quill. Perhaps, given another opportunity
to do better, the Court would seize on it.
Litigation has already begun in South Dakota and Alabama over their efforts to require
remote vendors to collect sales taxes. See generally South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc, 229 F
Supp 3d 1026 (D SD 2017); Statement of Newegg Inc. in Support of Its Notice of Appeal to
the Alabama Tax Tribunal, Newegg Inc v State ofAlabama Department of Revenue, Docket
No S 16-613 (Ala Tax Trib filed Aug 26, 2016). See also generally Maria Koklanaris, Both
Sides Pleased With Court Ruling Striking Down South Dakota Remote Sales Tax Law,
2017 State Tax Today 44-2 (Mar 8, 2017) (noting South Dakota representatives' desire to
take their case to the US Supreme Court); Maria Koklanaris, Retailer Challenges Alabama's
Economic Nexus Rule, 80 State Tax Notes 918 (2016).
46 See generally Donald Bruce, William F. Fox, and LeAnn Luna, State and Local
Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52 State Tax Notes 537 (2009). The research-
ers expect that such revenue losses "will likely continue to grow rapidly, at least for the
next several years." Donald Bruce, William F. Fox, and LeAnn Luna, E-tailer Sales Tax
Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68 Natl Tax J 735, 736 (2015). Some commentators have
questioned the accuracy of this estimate. See, for example, Joseph Henchman, The Mar-
ketplace Fairness Act: A Primer (Tax Foundation, July 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.ec/
CU6X-Z6W9; Billy Hamilton, Fox and Friends: The Rest of the Story on E-Commerce Tax
Loss Estimates, 68 State Tax Notes 535, 535-39 (2013); Noah Aldonas, DOR Disputes E-
Commerce Sales Tax Loss Estimates, 65 State Tax Notes 576, 576 (2012).
47 See note 45.
48 See note 3. Though they could theoretically do so, these states have not provided
direct sales tax relief to Amazon's customers, but as explained in Part I.A, those customers
receive sales tax relief indirectly due to the states' agreements with Amazon.
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than Amazon yet; 49 however, their use is ripe for analysis given
their recent emergence.
That Amazon is the first mover does not mean that it is the
sole candidate for customer-based incentives; other firms would
benefit from them as well, and states should be expected to offer
them to other firms as the potential benefits of the incentives-
discussed in the following parts-become clearer.5o Even so, wide-
spread use of the incentives might not be expected for a number
of practical reasons. First, sales-tax-based, customer-based incen-
tives necessarily have a diminishing return as more are offered.
The competitive advantage that arises from the incentives relies
on the firm not collecting sales taxes even though its competitors
do.51 The higher the percentage of competitors collecting sales taxes,
the larger the competitive advantage will be. While customer-based
incentives will likely never reach the scale of traditional incen-
tives, they can be tailored to address this problem. For one thing,
they can be offered on a temporary basis, allowing the state to
49 It is no surprise that Amazon is the firm that introduced customer-based incen-
tives to the world. Consider the following: Traditionally, targeted economic development
incentives were provided to manufacturing firms, such as airplane and car makers, which
employed large numbers of people and required large investments in infrastructure. See
generally Billy Hamilton, 16 Things You Need to Know about State Tax Breaks, 74 State
Tax Notes 267 (2014). See also Peter K. Eisinger, The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State
78-81 (Wisconsin 1988). Targeted customer-based incentives would have been unintuitive
to craft for manufacturers, as manufacturers typically do not have to collect taxes from
their customers. Thus, traditional incentives arose in the forms that they did, such as
income tax credits and property tax abatements. As the US economy shifted from manu-
facturing to services, relatively fewer large manufacturers were available for states to lure.
See Joshua P. Rubin, Note, Take the Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and
Relational Contracting, 70 NYU L Rev 1277, 1306 (1995) (noting the decline in manufac-
turing jobs). The states had to pay more for those firms or shift their efforts elsewhere.
States, accustomed to offering targeted traditional incentives to manufacturers, began
offering the same types of incentives to vendors without considering the possibility of
customer-based incentives. However, when Amazon began soliciting targeted economic
development incentives, its history of not having to collect sales taxes came into play-for
years it promoted the sales-tax-(collection)-free shopping experience its customers could
have by purchasing from it. See Pomp, State & Local Taxation at 6-41 (cited in note 31).
Realizing the value of the competitive advantage of not collecting sales taxes, Amazon
asked for customer-based incentives, introducing the concept to state policymakers. See
note 16. This series of events, or something similar, would explain how Amazon came to
be the first mover in this area.
50 See David Brunori, Requiem for Good Sales Tax Policy, 61 State Tax Notes 63, 63
(2011) ("By letting one of the world's largest retailers off the hook for collecting the tax,
Texas would have changed how everyone views the sales tax system. Other large retailers-
those with the requisite lobbying resources-would have sought similar deals.").
51 Einav, et al, 104 Am Econ Rev at 24 (cited in note 35). See also note 35.
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shift the incentives among firms over time.52 This might increase
competition for the incentives, improving the advantages states
receive in return. It might also decrease the value of the
customer-based incentives to the first firm to receive them if the
customer loyalty it gained is diminished by the sales-tax-free
shopping made available elsewhere.53 A better solution to the
problem of diminishing returns may be to limit the customer-
based incentives geographically, to allow for multiple firms to
receive them simultaneously in one state. Thus, customer-based
incentives might best be administered on a local level.
Additionally, the reason a firm is seeking out targeted eco-
nomic development incentives may affect whether customer-
based incentives are appealing. If the firm needs predictable
assistance in order to invest in the state, then customer-based
incentives will not be as effective in luring the firm as traditional
incentives because customer-based incentives do not provide
block grants of known tax relief-the firm must engage in com-
mercial activity before it sees any benefit from customer-based
incentives and the size of that benefit remains uncertain. How-
ever, if the firm is looking to increase its returns, customer-based
incentives may be appealing as they are not as concrete as tradi-
tional incentives tend to be-the more commercial activity the
firm engages in, the higher the benefit from customer-based
incentives. There is the potential that the benefit for the firm from
the customer-based incentives will be larger than the set amount
provided by traditional incentives.54
Finally, customer-based incentives appear to have a limited
universe of potential recipients-vendors responsible for collect-
ing sales taxes. However, this does not have to be the case. One
can conceive of a state offering people income tax credits for
engaging in transactions with a particular firm; similar general
incentives are made available by the federal government for
52 Indeed, Amazon's customer-based incentives have typically been for the relief of
its tax collection obligations for a one- or two-year period. See note 3.
53 See Baugh, Ben-David, and Park, Can Taxes Shape an Industry? at *24 (cited in
note 35); Hamilton, 72 State Tax Notes at 531 (cited in note 3); Henry J. Reske, Amazon
Study: Customers May Look Elsewhere When Sales Tax Advantage Ends, Sales Tax Today
78-1 (2014).
54 Even if the state places a limit on the sales taxes it will forego through the
customer-based incentives, customer-based incentives may produce larger benefits for the
firm than traditional incentives because of the way consumers react to each type of incentive.
See Part III.
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purchasing energy-efficient goods.55 What is important to the
customer-based incentive form is that tax relief is provided to
someone that interacts with a firm as a result of that very inter-
action with the firm. The firm may then figure out how to capture
some of that tax relief if it pleases. Creative policymakers should
be able to find ways to create customer-based incentives in a va-
riety of contexts.
Thus, many of the practical limitations on the growth of
customer-based incentives are not insurmountable. Customer-
based incentives will likely never fully replace traditional incen-
tives, but there is no reason that a state could not provide both to
a firm. Policymakers should thus invest time in better under-
standing how the incentives work and ways to make them more
effective.
II. THE PUZZLE OF CUSTOMER-BASED INCENTIVES
Though customer-based incentives appear primed to take on
a larger role in states' economic development efforts, whether
states should actually expand their use of such incentives may-
or, at least, should-depend on whether the difference in form
between customer-based incentives and traditional incentives
has substantive effects. Otherwise, the simple administrative
costs of adopting a new form of incentive should cause states to
prefer to continue relying on traditional incentives. Before the
next Parts analyze the potential benefits of customer-based in-
centives over traditional incentives, this Part argues that at least
one difference between the two types of incentives makes the
emergence of customer-based incentives appear quite odd. Be-
cause of predictable consumer biases regarding fairness and
losses, firms should be expected to have more difficulty capturing
the tax relief offered through customer-based incentives than that
offered through traditional incentives.
The fact that customer-based incentives provide tax relief to
a firm's customers rather than directly to the firm does not
necessarily mean that the firm will not receive any of the eco-
nomic value of that tax relief. Because the taxes relieved are still
levied generally, market prices should continue to reflect after-
tax prices if the marketplace is competitive. If the firm controls its
55 See, for example, IRC § 30B. However, one study found that sales tax incentives
were more effective than income tax incentives at generating demand for hybrid vehicles.
See Kelly Sims Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green? Incentives and
Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 1, 9 (2011).
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prices after receiving the incentives, it can keep them at the after-
tax, pre-incentives level, capturing the full benefit of the tax
relief.56 The ability of the firm to control prices depends on its
relative competitive position to consumers.57 One of the key char-
acteristics of targeted economic development incentives is that
they provide firms with a competitive advantage by lowering their
costs of doing business or the costs of doing business with them;
therefore, it is assumed that the firms have strong competitive
positions vis-A-vis their customers, as those firms are the only
ones able to offer lower after-tax prices.58 Thus, firms receiving
targeted economic development incentives may be expected to
control the post-incentives prices of what they sell.
If it is assumed that the firm's ability to control prices is
entirely unimpeded, then there is no reason to think that the
firm's ability to capture tax relief provided through customer-
based incentives is meaningfully different than its ability to cap-
ture tax relief provided through traditional incentives. Numerous
theories have demonstrated that, when rational actors and no
transaction costs are involved, the initial distribution of rights (or
benefits, or burdens, etc.) among parties should not matter; the
parties will transact with each other to reach their preferred
balance of rights.59 It is not surprising that the form of targeted
economic development incentives should not matter under the
same assumptions; the firm will be able to adjust pricing to reach
its preferred balance. However, relaxing the assumption that a
firm has entirely unimpeded control over prices after receiving
targeted economic development incentives introduces some
stickiness to the pre-incentives prices. In other words, when the
firm faces transaction costs to changing its prices, pre-incentives
56 Alternatively, if consumers control prices, then they could require that prices fall
by the full amount of the incentives, capturing the incentives.
57 Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 560-62 (Worth 2d ed 2007).
58 See Raymond E. Owens and Pierre-Daniel Sarte, Analyzing Firm Location Deci-
sions: Is Public Intervention Justified?, 86 J Pub Econ 223, 224 (2002) (making a similar
assumption in the context of targeted economic development incentives: "[s]ince the typi-
cal firm concerned is relatively large, and often faces a national demand curve for its
product, we allow firms to act as price setters").
59 See, for example, R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 2-6 (1960);
Rubert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation *4, 6
(University of Copenhagen Department of Econ Discussion Paper No 08-21, Oct 2008), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/487P-P962 (describing "Tax Liability Side Equivalence," the prin-
ciple that "it is matter [sic] of indifference whether a tax is levied on the buyers or sellers
in a market," as a "fundamental principle in public economics"); Slemrod, 61 Natl Tax J at
255-56 (cited in note 35) (describing the "Theorem of the Invariance of Tax Incidence").
1108 [84:1091
The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience
prices should be expected to remain in effect until the value of the
tax relief captured by changing prices outweighs the transaction
costs. Two major transaction costs to firms in adjusting their
prices are considered here: the costs imposed by the fairness con-
cerns of consumers and the costs imposed by the pain consumers
feel from losing tax relief to which they feel entitled.60
A. The Fairness of Pricing Changes
Research demonstrates that people value being treated fairly
and are willing to suffer economic harm to themselves in order to
punish those they perceive to be acting unfairly.61 Perhaps the
most well-known research in this area involves the ultimatum
game experiment. 2 In this experiment, two participants are given
the opportunity to share a sum of money; one participant proposes
a distribution between the two, and the other participant may
either accept or reject the proposal.63 If the proposal is accepted,
both participants get their proposed share of the money; if the
proposal is rejected, neither participant receives anything.64 Con-
trary to the expectations of rational actor theory, participants
routinely reject low-ball offers-they are willing to suffer eco-
nomic harm to avoid being treated unfairly and to punish the first
participant for making an unfair proposal.65 More complex itera-
tions of the ultimatum game reach similar results.66 This suggests
that if a firm is perceived as unfairly adjusting (or not adjusting)
60 See Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 27 Mktg Sci 15,
25 (2008) (discussing fairness concerns); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64
U Chi L Rev 1175, 1179-81 (1997) (discussing loss aversion).
61 See, for example, Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal L Rev
1051, 1136 (2000); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1479, 1489-96 (1998); Sunstein, 64
U Chi L Rev at 1186 (cited in note 60); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard
H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J Bus S285, S288-92 (1986);
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am Econ Rev 728, 736-37 (1986).
62 See Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1135-36 (cited in note 61) (discussing the
ultimatum game); Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1489-93 (cited in note 61)
(describing findings of ultimatum game experiments).
63 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1489-90 (cited in note 61).
64 Id.
65 Id at 1490.
66 See id at 1490-93.
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its prices after receiving targeted economic development incen-
tives, customers may punish the firm by refusing to shop with it.67
A firm should therefore consider how consumers can be expected
to react to price changes in response to the receipt of incentives
and the potential costs of establishing unfair prices.68
Researchers have studied how consumers judge the fairness
of price changes. In one influential study, Professors Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler conducted a series
of telephone surveys in which they posed a number of scenarios
to consumers to determine how the consumers judged the fairness
of different pricing practices.69 This research demonstrated that
consumers tend to judge the fairness of pricing changes based on
the interaction of two reference points: the firm's reference profit
and the customer's reference price.70 These reference points are
established prior to the proposed change;71 for purposes of this
analysis, it is assumed that the pre-incentives profit and price are
the appropriate reference points (though as developed below,
what exactly the pre-incentives price is in consumers' minds is
not clear). Further, the research demonstrates that customers
feel entitled to their reference prices but permit firms to protect
their reference profits at the expense of the reference prices;72
thus, it is perceived as fair for a firm to increase prices as the
result of increased costs of doing business, but it is perceived as
unfair for a firm to increase prices due to increased market
power. 73 Interestingly, people judge it fair for a firm to maintain
prices even if its costs of doing business decrease.74 Thus, people
67 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 736 (cited in note 61)
("[A] history or reputation of unfair dealing may induce potential transactors to take their
business elsewhere.").
6s See Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1515 (cited in note 61) ("[R]ecent
evidence of price stickiness shows that firms' behavior seems to be affected greatly by their
customers' perceptions of unfair price increases."); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J
Bus at S287 (cited in note 61).
69 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 729 (cited in note 61).
70 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J Bus at S296 (cited in note 61); Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 729-30 (cited in note 61). See also Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1496 (cited in note 61).
71 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J Bus at S297 (cited in note 61).
72 Id at S296 ("In a conflict between the transactor's claim to the reference price ...
and the firm's claim to its reference profit, it is acceptable for the firm to impose its claim
rather than compromise."); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 732 (cited
in note 61).
73 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J Bus at S293-96 (cited in note 61); Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 734-36 (cited in note 61).
74 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J Bus at S293-94 (cited in note 61); Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler, 76 Am Econ Rev at 734 (cited in note 61).
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expect to be charged the reference price, and fairness requires
only that the firm not take advantage of increased market power
to raise prices.
What do these findings mean in the context of targeted eco-
nomic development incentives? Certainly, consumers are not going
to object on fairness grounds to a firm lowering its prices. But will
the firm face pushback for maintaining after-tax, pre-incentives
prices? Traditional incentives provide direct tax relief to the firm,
lowering its costs of doing business; thus, consumers' fairness con-
cerns should not affect the ability of a firm receiving such incen-
tives to maintain pre-incentives prices and thereby increase its
profits. For example, suppose a jeans-selling firm receives a
traditional incentive. Prior to receiving the incentive, it sold jeans
to Amy for a price of $100 and generated a profit of $20. The firm's
reference profit is $20, and Amy's reference price is $100. If the
traditional incentive provided the equivalent of $10 of tax relief
for each sale, the firm would be able to maintain the $100 refer-
ence price and increase its profit to $30 on each sale without
offending the fairness sensibilities of its customers-it would not
be pressured to pass along a portion of the tax relief to its custom-
ers. Assuming a 5 percent sales tax, Amy would pay $105 total for
her jeans regardless of whether the firm receives the traditional
incentive. One might expect the $105 after-tax price to be Amy's
reference price, but whether Amy's reference price is $100 (the
pretax price) or $105 is irrelevant; when the firm maintains its
pretax price, the after-tax price is the same as well.
On the other hand, maintaining after-tax prices after receiv-
ing customer-based incentives may trigger fairness concerns in
consumers. This result will occur if consumers view the pretax
price instead of the after-tax price as the reference price. Because
customer-based incentives eliminate the sales taxes consumers
pay, maintaining the pretax price does not result in the same after-
tax price; to maintain the after-tax price and capture the tax
relief, the firm would need to increase the pretax price it charges.
As the firm faces no threat to its reference profit as a result of the
customer-based incentives, consumers will be unwilling to sacri-
fice their reference price; the increase in the pretax price will be
rejected on fairness grounds.
When consumers do not pay attention to sales taxes, the
consumers should be expected to think of the pretax price as the
reference price, as that is the price the consumers are basing their
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decisions on. 75 Research into "tax salience"-which has garnered
increasing amounts of academic attention in recent years 76 -
demonstrates that consumers often fail to fully take sales taxes
into account before making purchasing decisions.77 Tax salience
refers to the level of awareness a taxpayer has of a tax provision.78
This concept can be split into two components: first, awareness of
the economic effects of the tax provision-"market salience"-and
second, awareness that the tax provision is the source of those
economic effects-"practical salience."79 Though market salience,
which the next Part returns to in further detail, and practical
salience, which the next Section examines in more detail, are
related and may inform one another, they are distinct concepts. 80
To illustrate the difference between them, consider the example
of liquor excise taxes which are included in the posted price of the
75 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 29 (cited in note 11) ("[T]axpayers
appear to spotlight on the prices charged (or displayed) at the time of market decision-
making."); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 266 (cited in note 11) ("[Sltudies confirm the intuition
that unless the amount of the tax is prominent, consumers will make consumption deci-
sions 'pretax,' even though they are aware that a tax will be imposed and even where
calculation of the tax is relatively uncomplicated.").
76 See generally, for example, Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation,
81 U Chi L Rev 1443 (2014); Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 Tax L Rev 53
(2013); Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev 1307 (cited in note 13); Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L
Rev 19 (cited in note 11); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg 253 (cited in note 11); Jacob Nussim, To
Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 Colum J Tax L 218 (2010); Galle,
87 Wash U L Rev at 59 (cited in note 11); Sausgruber and Tyran, Tax Salience (cited in
note 59).
77 See Part IlIl.A. See also, for example, Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 26-
54 (cited in note 11) (surveying tax salience research); Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am
Econ Rev at 1145 (cited in note 12).
78 Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 262 (cited in note 11); Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L
Rev at 24 (cited in note 11); Galle, 87 Wash U L Rev at 62 (cited in note 11).
79 The literature on tax salience typically splits the term into market salience and
"political salience"-not practical salience. See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 24
(cited in note 11); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 272 (cited in note 11). I use the term "practical
salience" because "political salience" as used in the literature often focuses on the type of
awareness that leads to political reactions, which may not fully cover the awareness that
a tax provision is the source of economic effects, which is the concept I wish to describe.
Market salience and practical-or political-salience are not the only types of tax salience
that a taxpayer might experience. As an example of another type of salience that might
accompany a tax provision, Professor Andrew Hayashi argues that a provision's "legal
salience"-"the visibility or prominence of a tax [that] affects the likelihood that taxpayers
will use administrative remedies to reduce [the tax's] burden"-impacts the distribution
of the burden of the tax provision. Hayashi, 81 U Chi L Rev at 1456-58 (cited at note 76).
80 See David Gamage, On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mecha-
nisms and Limiting Factors, 41 Fla St U L Rev 173, 180 (2013) ("[B]oth market salience
and political salience are likely to result from similar operative mechanisms."); Schenk,
28 Yale J Reg at 273-76 (cited in note 11) (discussing the factors that influence the two
types of salience); Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 54-58 (cited in note 11).
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liquor rather than separately stated. Professors Raj Chetty,
Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft found that consumers responded
economically to such taxes as one would rationally expect them to
respond-an increase in tax lead to a proportionate decrease in
demand.81 Thus, the excise taxes were fully market salient to the
consumers. However, the researchers also found that the liquor
consumers were not aware that the excise taxes were the source
of price increases, blaming the business for the increases instead
of the taxing state.82 This result indicates that the taxes were not
practically salient to the consumers.
The tax salience research indicates that a firm receiving
traditional incentives will not face fairness transaction costs
when maintaining its pretax prices to capture the tax relief pro-
vided, but that a firm receiving customer-based incentives (at
least sales-tax-based ones) may if it must raise pretax prices to
capture the tax relief provided. Unless consumers can be con-
vinced to adopt after-tax prices as their reference prices, the firm
is less likely to capture the tax relief from customer-based incen-
tives than that from traditional incentives. However, even if sales
taxes become salient to consumers such that after-tax prices
become their reference price, another bias-loss aversion-may
hinder the firm's ability to capture tax relief from customer-based
incentives.
B. Practical Salience and Loss Aversion
As noted, practical salience refers to the awareness that a tax
provision is the source of economic effects that a person experi-
ences. 83 If a tax provision is practically salient to a person, the
person should be expected to react to the provision in such ways
as protecting or attacking it both politically and in their interac-
tions with nonpolitical actors.84 Exactly how tax provisions
become practically salient and how people will react to practically
salient taxes are often difficult things to predict.85 People are
motivated to take action for a number of reasons, of which the
81 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1158-64 (cited in note 12).
82 Id.
83 See note 79.
84 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 24-25 (cited in note 11); Schenk, 28
Yale J Reg at 273-74 (cited in note 11).
85 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 34 (cited in note 11) ("[I]t has been
notoriously difficult to test hypotheses for political salience.").
111320171]
1114 The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1091
practical salience of tax provisions is only one. 86 Even so, this
Section discusses different reactions that can be expected to arise
from the practical salience of tax relief from the different forms of
targeted economic development incentives, arguing that the lower
practical salience of tax relief from indirect customer-based incen-
tives than that from direct customer-based incentives explains
why firms would prefer tax-collection-obligation relief rather than
direct tax relief for their customers.
Studies indicate that factors affecting the practical salience
of a tax provision include the burden the provision places on the
taxpayer, particularly in terms of compliance;87 the transparency
of how the provision works;88 and whether the provision directly
falls on the taxpayer. 89 Thus, the market salience of a tax provi-
sion is likely to inform its practical salience; if a taxpayer realizes
the economic burden of the tax, the tax provision is more conspic-
uous than if the burden were not noticed. However, market sa-
lience does not fully define practical salience; even tax provisions
that have a high degree of market salience may have a low degree
86 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 276, 285 (cited in note 11). See also Edward J.
McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, Thinking about Tax, 12 Psychology, Pub Pol & L 106,
107-08 (2006) ("People decide complex matters-and tax raises a host of complex mat-
ters-by responding to the most salient or obvious aspect of a choice set or decision prob-
lem. They fail to take into account logically relevant information that is not immediately
available to their mental models.").
87 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 39-41 (cited in note 11); Schenk, 28
Yale J Reg at 272, 277 (cited in note 11); Aradhna Krishna and Joel Slemrod, Behavioral
Public Finance: Tax Design as Price Presentation, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Fin 189, 193-94
(2003) (discussing the effects of tax withholding).
88 See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 184 (cited in note 80) ("The pennies-a-day con-
cept thus supports the tax-system-complexity hypothesis that tax instruments which levy
many smaller payments over a period of time (e.g., sales taxes) may have lower political
salience than tax instruments which levy fewer larger tax payments (e.g., property
taxes)."); Krishna and Slemrod, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 198 (cited in note 87) (discussing
the effects of tax obfuscation); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 256-61, 277-80 (cited in note 11)
(discussing transparency and complexity in the political process regarding taxes); Joel
Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got It Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics,
66 FinanzArchiv/Pub Fin Analysis 15, 18-21 (2010) (discussing voter confusion and its
effect on tax complexity).
89 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 35-38 (cited in note 11); Schenk, 28
Yale J Reg at 727 (cited in note 11); Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, The Polit-
ical Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L Rev 1745, 1761-65 (2005) (discussing the
effects of indirect "hidden" taxes); Sausgruber and Tyran, Tax Salience at *2 (cited in note
59); Krishna and Slemrod, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 190 (cited in note 87).
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of practical salience.90 Consider the excise taxes on liquor dis-
cussed earlier; the excise taxes were market salient but were not
practically salient.91 Liquor consumers dissatisfied with the high
price of liquor might not understand that a source of their dissat-
isfaction is the excise taxes, and therefore the consumers might
not react to the taxes practically.
Tax relief from the different forms of targeted economic de-
velopment incentives should be expected to have different levels
of practical salience for consumers. Some basic level of practical
salience of tax relief provided by targeted economic development
incentives should exist for consumers; watchdog groups and gov-
ernment agencies issue reports regarding such incentives that
spur people to take action for or against them.92 However, tax
relief from traditional incentives should be less practically salient
to consumers than relief from customer-based incentives because
the tax relief from traditional incentives does not directly fall to
consumers. Further, indirect customer-based incentives should
be less practically salient to consumers than direct customer-
based incentives because, although the tax relief from indirect
customer-based incentives is directly experienced by the consum-
ers, the process by which consumers receive that relief is not as
transparent as the process behind tax relief provided through
direct customer-based incentives.93 Thus, on a scale, traditional
incentives will have the least amount of practical salience to con-
sumers, indirect customer-based incentives will fall in the middle,
and direct customer-based incentives will have the highest
amount of practical salience, all else being equal.94
90 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 274-76 (cited in note 11) (describing how various
forms of taxation might have various levels of both types of salience); Gamage and
Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 54-58 (cited in note 11).
91 See Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1158-64 (cited in note 12). See
also Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 56 (cited in note 11).
92 See generally, for example, Philip Mattera, Kasia Tarczynska, and Greg LeRoy,
Tax Breaks and Inequality: Enriching Billionaires and Low-Road Employers in the Name
of Economic Development (Good Jobs First, Dec 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3SDC-
3QUY. Good Jobs First is a prime example of a watchdog group that eyes targeted eco-
nomic development incentives. The group's "Subsidy Tracker" allows people access to in-
formation regarding the size of such incentives and what firms received them. See Subsidy
Tracker 3.0 (Good Jobs First), archived at http://perma.cc/M3M2-FQKP.
93 See note 88.
94 As a firm is a not an individual, it does not itself have awareness of the tax relief.
Thus, when discussing the firm's economic reactions to the various incentives, it is more
accurate to consider the reactions of the managers and owners of the firm (and customers,
which are discussed in the text). See Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a
Better Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax System?, 65 NYU Ann Surv Am L 525, 540
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The lower practical salience to consumers of traditional in-
centives and indirect customer-based incentives may cause con-
sumers to fail to perceive the full extent to which those incentives
are the source of tax relief that flows through to them. On the
other hand, the higher practical salience of direct customer-based
incentives to consumers should cause consumers to be more
aware that the tax relief they receive comes from those incentives.
The practical salience levels of the various forms of targeted eco-
nomic incentives are important because of a behavior known as
loss aversion-reacting more strongly to losses than gains from
the status quo. 95
(2010) ("When a firm is liable for a judgment, the economic burden of that judgment is
ultimately passed on to real people, whether they are the firm's owners, its workers, its
customers, or even investors in other businesses."); Rogers, 4 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol
at 109 (cited in note 29) ("Max abatements shift money from governments to businesses,
and that money is then passed along to consumers, workers and capital owners in the form
of wages, lower prices, or higher capital returns."). See also Gruber, Public Finance at 700
(cited in note 57); McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1883 (cited in note 6).
Because the tax relief from both forms of targeted economic development incentives is
negotiated for by and is immediate to firm managers, the tax relief from both forms of
incentives should have similar levels of practical salience to the managers. The existence
of this practical salience is evidenced by the fact that managers seek out targeted economic
development incentives from states. See generally, for example, Billy Hamilton, Down but
Not Out: States Haven't Given Up on Giveaways, 80 State Tax Notes 703 (2016) (discussing
recent targeted economic development incentive offerings). Because customer-based in-
centives are new and not fully understood and their tax relief does not fall directly to firms,
the tax relief from customer-based incentives may be less practically salient to managers
than traditional incentives. The limited experience with customer-based incentives ap-
pears to bear this out; after all, only Amazon has sought out these incentives as of yet.
See, for example, note 16. Even so, states wishing to provide customer-based incentives
should be able to increase their practical salience to firms' managers by educating the
managers of their benefits. Additionally, because neither form of incentive directly affects
owners of firms in their role as owners, the tax relief from neither form of incentive should
be more or less practically salient to the owners. However, to the extent that the two forms
of incentives are reported differently to owners (that is, reduced tax obligations due to
traditional incentives versus more dispersed gains in profits due to customer-based incen-
tives), the practical salience of the tax relief from the two forms of incentives may vary.
Assuming though that owners' primary concern is the profitability of the firm, the practi-
cal salience of the tax relief from the two different forms of incentives may not lead to
meaningfully different reactions from owners to either form, provided that the relief is
market salient. For a discussion on market salience of the relief to firms, see Part III.C.
Further research into this question is needed to make any firm conclusions, however.
95 See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 190-91 (cited at note 80) (discussing the effects
of loss aversion in the context of tax salience); Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1111
(cited in note 61) (discussing the status quo bias); Sunstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 1179-81
(cited in note 60) (discussing loss aversion); McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1874-75 (cited
in note 6) (same).
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Research has demonstrated that people commonly display
loss aversion, iterations of which are referred to as the endow-
ment effect or the status quo bias.96 In one of the most famous
experiments, researchers gave mugs to some participants and
nothing to others.97 They then asked the participants how much
money they would be willing to accept to part with the mugs and
how much money they would be willing to pay to acquire a mug,
respectively. The values placed on the mugs by those who were
given them were significantly higher than the prices others were
willing to pay to acquire them. When the roles were switched, the
same people who earlier had placed higher values on the mugs
they possessed indicated that they would not pay as much to ac-
quire a mug, demonstrating that people place a higher value on
losing things already possessed than gaining the same things. In
the tax context, Professors Edward McCaffery and Jonathan
Baron have demonstrated that people suffer from a form of loss
aversion they term "penalty aversion"-people prefer things la-
beled bonuses, such as a child bonus, which come across as gains,
to things labeled penalties, such as a childless penalty, which
come across as losses, even if the end results are the same.98
When consumers view the status quo as the tax relief from
targeted economic development incentives falling to them, loss
aversion will inhibit the firm's ability to capture that tax relief;
the firm's price increases would decrease demand for its goods
more than expected as customers feel the pain of losing the tax re-
lief they thought was theirs. The additional practical salience to
consumers of the tax relief provided through direct customer-based
incentives makes consumers more likely to view their receiving
96 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 Va Tax Rev 155, 173 (1996) ("The ex post enforcement
of tax laws implicates a cognitive phenomenon known as loss aversion. Basically, people
have a much greater aversion to giving up what we already have than we do to not getting
what we do not yet have."); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Persp
193, 194-203 (Winter 1991); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Non-
reversible Indifference Curves, 79 Am Econ Rev 1277, 1282-83 (1989); Tatiana A. Homonoff,
Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact of Taxes versus Bonuses on Dispos-
able Bag Use *36-37 (Princeton University Working Paper No 575, Mar 27, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/EWK8-A6TR (finding that a $0.05 tax on plastic bag use
decreased usage by significantly more than equal bonuses).
97 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 5 J Econ Persp at 195-97 (cited in note 96)
(describing the mug experiment).
98 See McCaffery and Baron, 12 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 114-15 (cited in note 86).
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that tax relief as the status quo. On the other hand, because tra-
ditional incentives and indirect customer-based incentives frame
the relief provided as that of the firm (either direct tax relief or
the relief of a collection obligation), the tax relief consumers
receive through those incentives appears as a gain to consumers
instead of a loss.99 The status quo in these instances is the firm
receiving an incentive and the customer paying sales tax. Fur-
ther, statutory incidence can go a long way in defining the status
quo;1 00 though a firm could conceivably promote its nonobligation
to collect sales taxes when it receives either direct or indirect
customer-based incentives, granting that collection relief to the
firm on the books makes people more likely to view the status quo
as the firm receiving a benefit.
Thus, because indirect customer-based incentives inhibit the
impact of loss aversion, firms should be expected to prefer them
over direct customer-based incentives. However, the mystery of
why a firm would prefer customer-based incentives over tradi-
tional incentives in the first place still remains; unlike customer-
based incentives, traditional incentives should trigger neither
loss aversion nor fairness concerns in consumers. The following
Part provides an explanation for this mystery by arguing that
customer-based incentives provide a larger benefit to firms than
traditional incentives, even if the firm is unable to capture the
actual tax relief provided through the incentives.
III. THE TAX SALIENCE SOLUTION TO THE CUSTOMER-BASED
INCENTIVES PUZZLE
State policymakers can implement their substantive policy
goals in a variety of forms. For instance, a state wishing to en-
courage economic development by convincing a firm to invest in
the state can provide that firm with traditional incentives or
customer-based incentives (or some mix of the two). Without pass-
ing judgment on the effectiveness of targeted economic develop-
ment incentives generally, this Part uses such incentives as a case
study to demonstrate that the choice of a tax provision's form is
significant; different forms of taxation intending to implement the
same policy can generate different substantive effects because
99 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 271-72 (cited in note 11).
100 See Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev 1112 (cited in note 61) (observing evidence
that default terms are likely to be seen as the status quo; thus those terms "will be
'sticky'"). See also Knetsch, 79 Am Econ Rev at 1280 (cited in note 96) (describing people's
"strong aversion to giving up an initial entitlement").
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they have different levels of salience to consumers. In particular,
differing levels of market salience-the awareness of a tax provi-
sion that affects a person's economic decision-makingo1-should
cause consumers to react more strongly to the tax relief provided
through customer-based incentives than that from traditional in-
centives. Coupled with the preference for indirect customer-based
incentives detailed in the prior Part, this result provides a solution
to the puzzling emergence of indirect customer-based incentives.102
A. The Degrees of Market Salience
As alluded to, recent research has demonstrated that tax pro-
visions have differing levels of market salience to taxpayers. 103
Tax provisions can be undersalient, fully salient, or hypersalient.104
The idea of full salience serves as a baseline for measuring when
a tax provision is undersalient or hypersalient-tax provisions
that are fully salient to a taxpayer have rationally expected
effects on the taxpayer's economic decision-making. In contrast,
tax provisions that are undersalient have smaller-than-expected
101 See notes 78-79.
102 The following analysis relies on the current state of research into the effects of tax
salience, but this area of study is relatively new and much remains to be learned. See
Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 270 (cited in note 11); Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 23
(cited in note 11). Additionally, tax salience is unlikely to be the only thing affecting peo-
ple's behavior in any given situation. Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 270 (cited in note 11).
Therefore, as the understanding of the effects of tax salience becomes more refined and
additional variables are considered, the conclusions presented here may need adjustment.
Even so, the following analysis is valuable because it provides a basis for considering the
effects of tax salience on the effectiveness of tax provisions and demonstrates that the
choice of form of a tax provision does matter even if other factors must be considered to
fully understand how people's behavior can influence the effectiveness of a tax provision.
See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 59 (cited in note 11):
It may thus be tempting to conclude that policy debates should ignore intuitions
about tax salience until (or unless) these intuitions receive more satisfactory
empirical support. Yet it must be recognized that intuitions about tax salience
already significantly influence debates over tax policy. So long as important
political actors (and perhaps also the voters on whose support they depend) make
tax policy decisions based on naive intuitions about tax salience, scholars must
continue to analyze .these intuitions based on whatever evidence can be mus-
tered-no matter how inconclusive the evidence might be.
103 See note 77.
104 See Galle, 67 Tax L Rev at 63-67 (cited in note 76).
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effects on the economic actions of those affected,105 and tax provi-
sions that are hypersalient have greater-than-expected effects.106
Theory suggests that a behavior termed "spotlighting" affects
the market salience of a particular tax provision to the tax-
payer.107 Spotlighting refers to the tendency of a person to focus
on particularly conspicuous components of a price or transaction
to the exclusion of other components, thereby misperceiving the
total cost of the transaction.os Thus, taxes paid manually by the
taxpayer are more salient than taxes paid automatically, 109 imme-
diate taxes are more salient than delayed taxes,11 0 and aggregated
105 See id at 64; Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity
Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 Yale L J 258, 269 (2012); Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at
1309 (cited in note 13); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 263 (cited in note 11); Nussim, 1 Colum
J Tax L at 220 (cited in note 76); Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1165, 1175
(cited in note 12); Galle, 87 Wash U L Rev at 77 (cited in note 11).
106 Galle, 67 Tax L Rev at 91-94 (cited in note 76); Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1317
(cited in note 13). Professor Lilian V. Faulhaber observes that hypersalience occurs "when
a tax provision is fully-or almost fully-salient, but the limits restricting that provision's
application are hidden, or less salient." Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1309 (cited in note 13).
As developed, this Article argues that hypersalience can occur simply through an overes-
timation of taxes.
107 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 26 (cited in note 11). See also Edward
J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect of Indirect Effects of
Fiscal Policies, 19 J Behav Dec Making 289, 289-91 (2006) (discussing isolation effects,
which are similar to spotlighting). Spotlighting is not the only theoretical basis for differ-
ing levels of tax salience. Another popular theory suggests that "ironing" affects the
salience of taxes. Ironing refers to the "smoothing" of tax rates by mentally applying one
average tax rate to all income even though rates vary, causing a misunderstanding of one's
actual tax burden. See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 31-33 (cited in note 11)
(discussing research on ironing). As Professors David Gamage and Darien Shanske note,
"[iln essence, ironing is a form of spotlighting behavior wherein taxpayers spotlight on
their average tax rates instead of using their effective marginal tax rates." Id at 31. In
addition, the ironing theory depends on the availability of a complex schedule of tax rates
and is thus more suited for understanding the salience of income taxes than sales taxes.
For these reasons, this Article proceeds with the spotlighting theory to explain tax salience.
108 Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 177 (cited in note 80).
109 See Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax
Rates, and Tax Revolts *29-30 (NBER Working Paper No 18514, Nov 2012), archived at
http://perma.c/N3P8-6ZKW (finding that automatically deducted property taxes were less
salient than those paid manually); Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax- Tax Salience and Tax Rates,
124 Q J Econ 969, 980-81 (2009) (finding that drivers responded less strongly to highway
tolls that were automatically deducted from the driver's account than those that were
manually paid to a toll operator by the driver).
110 See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 183 (cited in note 80) ("With regard to market
salience, studies of the spotlighting hypotheses found that taxpayers often discount taxes
that are not assessed until after market decisions are made."); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at
271 (cited in note 11); Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1165 (cited in note 12).
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taxes are more salient than broken-up taxes,"' all because the
total cost of the tax becomes more conspicuous.
Sales taxes are a prime example of taxes that may be under-
salient; consumers spotlight on tax-free posted prices and ignore
the cost of the taxes. 2 For example, in one of the more well-
known studies, Professors Chetty, Looney, and Kroft ran a three-
week-long experiment in grocery stores in which they included
the sales tax in the posted price of goods on the shelves.113 This
action caused a decrease in sales of the goods, indicating that peo-
ple had not been paying full attention to the taxes before they
were included but instead had spotlighted on the tax-free posted
prices. The act of spotlighting on nontax elements of a price or a
transaction alone does not necessarily mean that the tax will be
undersalient to the parties involved."1 After all, a consumer that
spotlights on pretax prices could be aware of the tax generally
(that is, it could be practically salient to the consumer) but over-
estimate its burden. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft posit
that the market salience effects they observed in their grocery
store experiment derived from consumers believing that calculat-
ing the burden of the taxes would be too costly, so they instead
ignored the taxes and focused on posted prices.125 This theory
requires the consumer to know about the tax but to underreact
to it.
At least two predictable behaviors contribute to the likelihood
that an ignored tax will become undersalient. First, people dis-
play "anchoring bias" when making estimates of unknown val-
ues.116 Anchoring causes a person's estimates to gravitate toward
11 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 27 (cited in note 11) (describing the
basic phenomenon of "spotlighting"-when "taxpayers focus[ ] only on certain components
of an aggregate price and thereby underestimat[e] the aggregate price"); Krishna and
Slemrod, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 192-93 (cited in note 87). For a review of research
regarding the salience of partitioned pricing, see generally Eric A. Greenleaf, et al, The
Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A Review of Research on
Partitioned Pricing, 26 J Consumer Psychology 105 (2016).
112 Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 273 (cited in note 11).
113 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1150-51 (cited in note 12).
114 See Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 231-33 (cited in note 76).
115 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1165 (cited in note 12). See also
Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 193-94 (cited in note 80); Sausgruber and Tyran, Tax
Salience at *5 (cited in note 59).
116 Greenleaf, et al, 26 J Consumer Psychology at 116, 119 (cited in note 111); Sean
D. Campbell and Steven A. Sharpe, Anchoring Bias in Consensus Forecasts and Its Effect
on Market Prices, 44 J Fin & Quant Analysis 369, 388-89 (2009); Nicholas Epley and
Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are
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a conspicuous number, even if that number has nothing to do with
what is being estimated."' For instance, in one study, people were
asked to spin a wheel numbered 0 to 100 and then estimate vari-
ous percentages, such as the percentage of African countries in
the United Nations.118 Despite the clear arbitrariness of the
numbers on the wheel, people's estimates gravitated toward the
number they spun.11 9 When consumers spotlight on pretax prices,
those prices will set an anchor for their estimates of the tax they
will owe, causing the consumers to underestimate the taxes.120
Additionally, people display "optimism bias," which causes
them to underestimate the likelihood of losses and overestimate
that of gains.121 For example, optimism bias may lead consumers
to disregard consumer product safety warnings because the con-
sumers undervalue the possible harms from the product.122 An
optimistic consumer that has not calculated the actual value of
the taxes that she will owe may similarly underestimate that
value.123 However, most of the research on optimism bias focuses
on relative risks-the risk an individual faces when compared to
other people-and taxes may not fit this mold, potentially weak-
ening the expected effect of optimism bias in the context of the
Insufficient, 17 Psychological Sci 311, 316-i7 (2006); J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cogni-
tive Bias, 24 L & Phil 393, 406-07 (2005); Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1100-02
(cited in note 61).
117 See Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1100-02 (cited in note 61); Sunstein, 64 U
Chi L Rev at 1188 (cited in note 60); McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1916 (cited in note 6).
118 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, 185 Sci 1124, 1128 (1974).
119 Id.
120 See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 189-90 (cited in note 80) (discussing the poten-
tial effects of the anchoring bias in the tax salience context).
121 See, for example, Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 229 (cited in note 76); Manju Puri
and David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J Fin Econ 71, 75-76 (2007);
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw U L Rev 1373, 1375-76 (2004); Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand L Rev 1653, 1659-
62 (1998); Sunstein, 64 U Chi L Rev at 1182-84 (cited in note 60); Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J Personality & Soc Psychology 806,
818-19 (1980).
122 Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L Rev 1193, 1243-44 (1994).
123 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 270-71 (cited in note 11). Compare Bar-Gill, 98 Nw
U L Rev at 1375-76 (cited in note 121) (discussing an "underestimation bias" in the context
of future borrowing that results in part from the optimism bias), with Puri and Robinson,
86 J Fin Econ at 92 (cited in note 121) (arguing that moderate optimism can lead to pru-
dent economic decision-making).
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market salience of tax provisions.124 Even so, if a consumer is con-
sidering the probability that a certain tax rate will apply, she may
be inclined to expect a lower tax rate due to optimism bias.
It should be noted that the research on the salience of sales
taxes has focused primarily on shopping in physical stores, not
over the Internet.125 As noted, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft theorized
that calculating the burden of the taxes would be too costly for
consumers, leading them to ignore the taxes and focus on posted
prices.126 Education is thought to be one of the primary methods
of making taxes more salient,127 and the Internet offers vendors
the ability to make sales taxes more salient by offering quick
information on after-tax prices, reducing consumers' calculation
costs and making the taxes more immediate.128 Therefore, sales
taxes may be more salient on Internet purchases, though the
taxes can remain broken up and not necessarily immediately
available (they may not show up until the customer goes to a
checkout page having already made the decision to buy), so some
undersalience concerns may still exist.
Finally, some tax provisions may be hypersalient, affecting
taxpayers' economic actions to a greater degree than expected
from rational actors.129 The deduction for charitable contributions
has been described as hypersalient because it encourages taxpay-
ers who are not eligible to claim the deduction to make charitable
contributions; taxpayers spotlight on the deduction, ignoring the
limitations on claiming it.130 As a result, people make more chari-
table contributions than might be rationally expected from an eco-
nomic point of view.
This market salience research indicates two ways that the
forms of targeted economic development incentives can affect
124 See, for example, Marta P. Coelho, Unrealistic Optimism: Still a Neglected Trait,
25 J Bus & Psychology 397, 404 (2010).
125 See generally, for example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev 1145 (cited
in note 12).
126 See text accompanying notes 112-14.
127 See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 195-98 (cited in note 80); Faulhaber, 92 BU L
Rev at 1323-25 (cited in note 13); Goldin, 122 Yale L J at 283-85 (cited in note 105);
Sausgruber and Tyran, Tax Salience at *23 (cited in note 59).
128 For anecdotal evidence of websites providing the opportunity to inform consumers
about taxes, see Apple iPhone 7- 32GB - Black - Unlocked - CDMA/GSM (Google Shopping),
archived at http://perma.cc/27FM-2DYJ. See also Anderson, et al, 47 J Mktg Rsrch at 239
(cited in note 35) (concluding that consumers do not react to sales taxes in the context of
catalog orders as robustly as they do in the context of Internet orders at least partially
because consumers can more easily compare prices on the Internet).
129 See note 106.
130 Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1309-10 (cited in note 13).
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firms differently. First, as discussed above, when consumers
adopt pretax prices as reference prices because sales taxes are
undersalient to them, firms will have difficulty capturing tax
relief from customer-based incentives because of consumers' fair-
ness concerns.131 Second, if either form of targeted economic
development incentives is undersalient or hypersalient to con-
sumers or to firms, then their responses to those incentives will
not meet economically rational expectations. The following sec-
tions explain why tax relief from customer-based incentives
should be hypersalient to consumers but tax relief from tradi-
tional incentives should not, causing customer-based incentives
to generate more demand for the firm's goods.
B. The Market Salience of Tax Relief from Targeted Economic
Development Incentives to Consumers
Because firms control prices, they also control the amount of
tax relief that consumers receive;132 it is the market salience of
this amount of tax relief to consumers that is important. If the
firm passes no tax relief onto consumers, then there is nothing for
the consumers to be aware of and react to economically. The tax
relief from the different forms of targeted economic development
incentives that is passed on to consumers can be expected to have
different levels of market salience to consumers; relief from
traditional incentives should be fully salient, but relief from
customer-based incentives should have some degree of hyper-
salience. This difference in salience is what causes customer-
based incentives to generate more demand for the firm's goods
than traditional incentives.
The tax relief from traditional incentives should be fully
market salient to consumers because when a firm lowers its prices
to pass along the tax relief, the economic effect of the relief is
immediately available and visible to consumers. There is no need
to self-compute the value of the tax relief, nor is the relief dis-
aggregated or delayed. In short, the value of the tax relief is not
economically hidden in any way from consumers (they may not
realize that the tax relief is the source of the price decreases, but
that misperception relates to practical salience, not market sa-
lience). Recall again the excise taxes on liquor studied by Chetty,
131 See Part H.A.
132 See note 58 and accompanying text.
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Looney, and Kroft: these taxes were not separately stated to con-
sumers, but instead were included in the posted price of the liquor.
This inclusion made the taxes fully market salient-consumers'
preferences responded to increases in the taxes as expected.133
On the other hand, the tax relief provided by customer-based
incentives could realistically be undersalient, fully salient, or
hypersalient to consumers. However, because consumers are pre-
disposed to finding tax relief hypersalient, as discussed below,
and it is in both the state's and the firm's interest for consumers
to find that tax relief hypersalient,134 hypersalience is the expected
result.
Consumers might find the tax relief from customer-based in-
centives undersalient through the same mechanisms that they
find certain sales taxes undersalient. When consumers spotlight
on pretax prices and make their purchasing decisions before being
exposed to taxes, they underestimate the value of those taxes.13
Like those taxes, the tax relief from customer-based incentives is
not immediate and could be overlooked by a consumer spotlight-
ing on pretax prices. Though the consumer may be pleasantly sur-
prised to find that she received tax relief for taxes she was not
paying attention to, that tax relief would not affect her economic
decision-making.
Similarly, the tax relief provided by customer-based incen-
tives might be fully salient to consumers in the same way that
other sales taxes are fully salient.136 As noted, Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft posit that spotlighting on pretax prices occurs because
consumers think that the personal cost of calculating after-tax
prices is too high for the benefit obtained.137 However, consumers
could be easily debiased by providing them with information on
after-tax prices prior to their decision-making process through
such mechanisms as posting after-tax prices in stores or display-
ing a tax calculator or after-tax prices online.138 Providing con-
sumers with immediate information on post-incentive prices or
the explicit amount of tax relief provided to them should make
that tax relief fully salient.
133 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1164 (cited in note 12).
134 See Part IV.
135 See notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
136 See text accompanying notes 127-28.
137 See text accompanying note 115.
138 See text accompanying note 127.
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Finally, consumers could find the tax relief provided by
customer-based incentives hypersalient-they might overreact
economically to the tax relief. This result may seem fanciful ini-
tially, but consumers are primed toward this result because of two
behaviors: tax-label aversion and optimism bias. Research
demonstrates that people are affected by tax aversion-they have
negative preferences for taxes.1 39 A subcategory of tax aversion is
tax-label aversion, in which people value the relief of charges
labeled taxes; the tax label itself affects people's preferences.140
For example, Professors Abigail Sussman and Christopher
Olivola, through a series of surveys, found that people were
(i) more likely to drive thirty minutes out of their way to buy a
television sales-tax-free than to drive the same distance for a
slightly larger price discount, (ii) willing to stand in line longer
for a tax-free purchase than an identically discounted purchase
with tax, and (iii) more likely to prefer tax-free municipal bonds
than other bonds, even when the final economic return was equiv-
alent.'' Other commentators have observed overconsumption re-
sulting from sales tax holidays offered by states.142 The satisfac-
tion people feel from avoiding taxes adds to their desire to
139 See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 50 (cited in note 11); Schenk, 28 Yale
J Reg at 298 (cited in note 11); Sussman and Olivola, 48 J Mktg Rsrch at S99 (cited in note
15); David J. Hardisty, Eric J. Johnson, and Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World?
Attribute Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 Psychological Sci 86, 88
(2010); McCaffery and Baron, 12 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 117-19 (cited in note 86);
McCaffery and Baron, 52 UCLA L Rev at 1759-61 (cited in note 89); Edward J. McCaffery
and Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Thinking about Tax, 96 Ann Conf Taxn 434,
437-39 (2003). See also generally Rosenberg, 16 Va Tax Rev 155 (cited in note 96) (detail-
ing how people dislike taxes); Christopher C. Fennell and Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and
Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 Wash U J L & Pol 75 (2003) (pro-
posing a research agenda regarding tax aversion).
140 See Sussman and Olivola, 48 J Mktg Rsrch at S99 (cited in note 15) ("Across five
experiments, we have demonstrated that people exhibit tax aversion, defined as a tendency
to avoid taxes more than other equivalent (or even larger) costs."); Hardisty, Johnson, and
Weber, 21 Psychological Sci at 88 (cited in note 139) ("[P]articipants were more likely to
prefer the more expensive product and were more supportive of regulation when the cost
increase was described as a carbon offset than when it was described as a carbon tax.");
Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 50 (cited in note 11) ("[T]he tax-label aversion
hypothesis is based on the notion that the mere labeling of a policy as a 'tax' can reduce
voter support for the policy."); McCaffery and Baron, 12 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 119
(cited in note 86) ("In sum, labels matter, and tax tends to be a negative one."); Homonoff,
Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects at *4 (cited in note 96) ("[R]ecent evidence sug-
gests that customers are more likely to avoid any charge that is framed as a tax (as op-
posed to a fee).").
141 Sussman and Olivola, 48 J Mktg Rsrch at S99 (cited in note 15).
142 Fennell and Fennell, 13 Wash U J L & Pol at 80-81 (cited in note 139). Sales tax
holidays are limited periods of time during which a state exempts certain purchases-
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transact with a firm receiving customer-based incentives, causing
what appears to be an overreaction to the actual value of the tax
relief provided by customer-based incentives. All the firm needs
to do to enjoy the resulting increased demand is make the con-
sumers aware that they can shop sales-tax-free if they shop with
the firm.143 In this vein, many online vendors have promoted
sales-tax-free Internet shopping as a major reason to purchase
from them instead of local vendors.144
In addition, if the consumer understands that she will be re-
ceiving sales tax relief, but does not precisely know the amount of
the relief, the consumer's optimism bias may cause her to over-
estimate the value of the tax relief. As noted, this bias causes peo-
ple to underestimate losses and to overestimate gains.14s Thus, for
any given reference price, consumers can be expected to under-
estimate the losses from having to pay sales taxes and to over-
estimate the gains from the tax relief provided if they understand
that such taxes and tax relief will be in place but do not know the
value of those things. The same actions a firm takes to trigger its
customers' tax-label aversion could also trigger this overestima-
tion of the relief if the firm avoids providing any hard numbers
regarding the amount of tax relieved.146 Further, assuming the
customer is focusing on the idea of receiving tax relief, anchoring
bias may not affect the consumer's estimation of the tax relief be-
cause there is no initial value given to the consumer on which to
usually purchases related to children's education-from sales taxes. Overconsumption
during a sales tax holiday thus indicates that people overreact to taxes when they are
imposed.
143 See Sussman and Olivola, 48 J Mktg Rsrch at S100 (cited in note 15). Gamage
notes that people are typically averse to being manipulated, and this aversion can affect
how firms interact with their customers. See Gamage, 41 Fla St U L Rev at 199-202 (cited
in note 80). There appears to be little risk of causing consumers to feel manipulated by the
mere advertising of sales-tax-free shopping, though if pretax price raising also occurs, the
aversion to being manipulated could reinforce the fairness concerns discussed in Part II.A.
144 See, for example, Ordering Information (Wayfair LLC), archived at http://perma.cc/
SZ4P-X7FJ ("One of the best things about buying through Wayfair is that we do not have
to charge sales tax, with a few notable exceptions."). Indeed, as noted earlier, this existing
advantage of remote vendors like Amazon may be a primary driver in seeking out
customer-based incentives. See note 44. Essentially, the remote vendor is seeking to main-
tain the status quo-in which it may take advantage of consumer behaviors such as tax-
label aversion to increase demand-when it agrees to invest in the state.
145 See note 121.
146 See Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1336-39, 1342 (cited in note 13); Galle, 67 Tax L
Rev at 92 (cited in note 76) (arguing that firms would be incentivized to mask aspects of
tax penalties that might affect consumer behavior in a way that is detrimental to the firms);
Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 267 (cited in note 11) ("The way the tax is framed may make it
less prominent."); Slemrod, 66 FinanzArchiv/Pub Fin Analysis at 21 (cited in note 88).
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anchor.147 However, a consumer might anchor to posted prices if
the idea of tax relief is not conspicuous enough; this result might
lessen the hypersalience of the tax relief.
Though the actual scale of the hypersalience of tax relief from
customer-based incentives is uncertain, because research indi-
cates that consumers can-and are likely to-find such tax relief
hypersalient, customer-based incentives can be expected to gen-
erate more benefit for the firm than traditional incentives.148 In
fact, the firm may benefit without altering its prices at all (though
the option to do so remains); it can maintain reference prices and
still be more competitive than its peers.1 49 The increased demand
for the firm's goods resulting from any hypersalience of customer-
based incentives' tax relief thus should lead the firm to prefer
customer-based incentives over traditional incentives of the same
amount.15 0 For a firm like a remote vendor, already experiencing
the effects of such hypersalience, customer-based incentives offer
the opportunity to maintain that status quo after investing in the
state;"1 traditional incentives do not.
C. The Market Salience of Tax Relief from Targeted Economic
Development Incentives to Firms
Might the market salience of tax relief from targeted economic
development incentives to firms affect which form is preferable?
This Section argues that, because firms' economic reactions to the
two forms of targeted economic development incentives are likely
to be similar, those reactions should not lead to the forms gener-
ating different effects. When discussing the firm's economic reac-
tions to the various incentives, it is more accurate to consider the
reactions of the managers, owners, and customers of the firm, as
147 See Greenleaf, et al, 26 J Consumer Psychology at 116 (cited in note 111); Campbell
and Sharpe, 44 J Fin & Quant Analysis at 388-89 (cited in note 11); Epley and Gilovich,
17 Psychological Sci at 311-12 (cited in note 116); Trout, 24 L & Phil at 406-07 (cited in
note 116); Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1100-02 (cited in note 61).
148 See Einav, et al, 104 Am Econ Rev at 3-4 (cited in note 35) (estimating that a sales
tax of 10 percent reduces demand by 15 percent, demonstrating a degree of hypersalience);
McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1907-08 (cited in note 6) (predicting that taxpayers' biases
will give nontaxable fringe benefits "added luster" because of the nontaxable label).
149 Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1336-39 (cited in note 13).
150 Galle, 67 Tax L Rev at 65 (cited in note 76) ("Third parties, especially those who
might capture some of the benefit of the price instrument, can be another source of hyper-
salience."); Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1328-30 (cited in note 13).
151 See note 144.
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the firm itself does not have awareness. 152 The reactions of the
customers were discussed in the prior Section.
The market salience of the tax relief provided through tradi-
tional incentives is unlikely to be misperceived by the managers
of the recipient firm because the relief is negotiated, direct, and
immediate.153 The negotiation process offers the managers the op-
portunity to overcome any existing misconception of the firm's tax
burden by requiring them to consider the value of the tax relief
being offered (and thus the initial tax imposed), as well as any
limitations on it. Further, the managers' rationally expected re-
sponse to the tax relief is buoyed by the fact that the relief is pro-
vided directly to the firm and is immediate in the sense that the
managers are aware of it prior to making any business location
decisions and pricing decisions. Similar to the case with tradi-
tional incentives, tax relief from customer-based incentives
should be fully salient to the firm's managers. Though the tax re-
lief is not provided directly to the firm, its value is not obscured
to the managers by that fact because the firm must negotiate for
the incentives and the incentives are also immediate.
In the same way that consumers should be expected to find
the tax relief from traditional incentives fully market salient-
because the relief is passed along to them through changes to
posted prices154-a firm's owners should find the tax relief from
either form of targeted economic development incentives to be
fully market salient. Neither form of incentives causes tax relief
to fall directly to the owners; relief is passed through to them only
in the form of dividends or changes to the value of their ownership
interests. These objective measures of value offer little oppor-
tunity for owners to misperceive the economic value of the tax
relief provided to their firms. Thus, no differences arise in how
either form economically affects firms as a result of their behavior
because managers and owners of firms should be expected to react
similarly to both forms of incentives.155 Therefore, firms' prefer-
ence for customer-based incentives should remain intact.
152 See note 94.
153 See notes 109-11 and accompanying text. This analysis assumes that the managers
of the firm share quality information with each other, which may be counterfactual for
many firms.
154 See text accompanying note 133.
155 The tax relief from the two forms of incentives might be expected to have different
levels of practical salience to firm owners, provided that the incentives are reported to
owners differently. See note 94.
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IV. CUSTOMER-BASED INCENTIVES AS SOUND POLICY?
Firms may prefer customer-based incentives, but what ad-
vantages might customer-based incentives offer states?i56 This
Part argues that customer-based incentives have the ability to
generate more benefits for society than traditional incentives
because consumers feel more satisfaction from the tax relief pro-
vided by customer-based incentives and because customer-based
incentives are more likely to reduce the negative effects of the
taxes they relieve. Further, there are strong reasons to believe
that customer-based incentives will be seen as more equitable
than traditional incentives because of the way they provide tax
relief, strengthening the case for states to prefer customer-based
incentives. To these ends, this Part addresses three significant
issues that the form of the incentives might affect: the social wel-
fare each form might generate, the "escape" of tax relief from the
state's economy, and the erosion of civic virtue that results from
the nonenforcement of tax laws.157
156 This discussion assumes that the state has decided to provide targeted economic
development incentives in the first place; thus it does not enter into the lively debate over
whether such incentives should be offered at all. See Oesterle, 6 Ohio St Entrepreneurial
Bus L J at 495-98 (cited in note 27) (detailing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of
economic development incentives); Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Incentives for Economic De-
velopment: Personal (and Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 Case W Reserve L Rev 1145, 1148-
50 (2008) ("[T]he tax incentives states and localities grant are, as a substantive matter,
often inefficient and typically unfair."); Rogers, 4 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 101 (cited
in note 29) ("State tax incentives do not affect where businesses locate. There is near con-
sensus in the empirical literature on this point."); Steven M. Rauser, Clearing the Hurdles:
Are State Tax Incentives Worth the Effort?, 8 State & Local Tax Law 105, 105-14 (2003);
Petrov, Note, 33 Case W Reserve J Intl L at 77-80 (cited in note 26) (documenting the
debate over the effectiveness of economic development incentives); Pischak, 8 J State Taxn
at 197-203 (cited in note 7).
157 These issues should affect voters', and thus the state's, preferences. Initially,
because the different forms of targeted economic development incentives have different
levels of practical salience for consumers, people can be expected to have different prefer-
ences regarding their use. Tax-averse people may prefer taxes that are less practically
salient because such taxes may be less painful to experience, and those same people may
prefer the opposite for tax relief. See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 284 (cited in note 11);
McCaffery and Baron, 52 UCLA L Rev at 1762 (cited in note 89). Others may desire more-
salient tax provisions to ensure the public is able to meaningfully check the growth of
government and acts of self-serving politicians. See Galle, 87 Wash U L Rev at 94-98 (cited
in note 11); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 287-94 (cited in note 11); Zelinsky, 58 Case W Reserve
L Rev at 1146-47 (cited in note 156). Customer-based incentives may be somewhat more
transparent to taxpayers than traditional incentives simply because the firm has an in-
centive to alert consumers in some way to the fact that it is receiving incentives. Though
clever firms may find ways to mask the customer-based incentives, a firm-receiving tradi-
tional incentives would have no apparent incentive to alert taxpayers to that fact. In any
event, there is no inherently appropriate level of practical salience for tax provisions; that
level is a political matter. See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 81-82 (cited in
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A. The Effects of Targeted Economic Development Incentives
on Social Welfare
An issue for states to consider when deciding what form of
targeted economic development incentive to offer a firm is the po-
tential effects of the different forms on social welfare. Social wel-
fare refers to the overall well-being of society-the accumulation
of the benefits generated by interactions within society.158 Tax
provisions typically diminish the amount of social welfare by gen-
erating what is referred to as "deadweight loss"-the social wel-
fare lost because the cost of taxes causes people to stop engaging
in otherwise-beneficial transactions.159 Figure 1 presents a basic
note 11); Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 284, 310 (cited in note 11); Sausgruber and Tyran, Tax
Salience at *23 (cited in note 59) (observing that the "use of non-salient taxes could allow
budget-maximizing politicians and bureaucrats to increase tax revenues beyond what cit-
izens deem appropriate").
158 Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 258 (cited in note 76) (describing social welfare as
"the aggregate of individual well-being"); Gruber, Public Finance at 50, 52 (cited in note
57). Generally speaking, members of society have heterogeneous preferences-they prefer
different things. For example, given $100 to spend on either concert tickets or a new tele-
vision, Ben might prefer to purchase the tickets while Carly might prefer to purchase the
television. The reason for these heterogeneous preferences results from each member of
society placing different values on different things. Though the concert tickets and televi-
sion might both cost $100, Ben personally values the concert tickets at $200 and Carly at
$50; the values they each place on the television might be swapped. Therefore, given the
choice between paying $100 for one or the other, Ben will buy the concert tickets, and
Carly will buy the television. Not only will both Ben and Carly have things that they pre-
fer, both also experience the joy of obtaining those things for less money than they valued
them at. Overall social welfare is increased not only by the profit that the sellers generate
from selling the tickets and television, but also by the satisfaction Ben and Carly receive.
See Gruber, Public Finance at 50, 52 (cited in note 57) (describing social surplus and social
welfare).
159 Galle, 87 Wash U L Rev at 66-67 (cited in note 11); Gruber, Public Finance at 578-
80 (cited in note 57). After taxes, consumers are less willing to purchase the same quantity
of a good because the price they must pay increases, and vendors are less willing to sell
the same quantity of the good as the amount they receive for each sale decreases. Nussim,
1 Colum J Tax L at 234-36 (cited in note 76); Gruber, Public Finance at 578-83 (cited in
note 57). For instance, suppose a 5 percent sales tax is levied on all sales and customers
bear the full cost of the tax. Taking the example from the prior footnote, the concert tickets
and television cost consumers $105 instead of the pretax $100. Ben and Carly still value
the tickets and television more than $105 respectively and will still purchase each, but
other consumers who value the items at between $100 and $105 will no longer purchase
them. This resulting shift in preferences is known as the "substitution effect" of the tax.
Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 235 (cited in note 76); Gruber, Public Finance at 36 (cited in
note 57). The substitution effect reduces consumer surplus and vendor surplus in an ab-
solute way-some of the pretax social welfare is lost because welfare-generating transac-
tions are not engaged in; this is the deadweight loss due to the tax. Gruber, Public Finance
at 51-52, 578-83 (cited in note 57).
Taxes also generate what is known as the "income effect": when Ben and Carly make
their purchases and bear the burden of the taxes, they each have less income remaining
than in the no-tax world (that is, they each are $5 worse off), affecting their remaining
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graphical representation of these concepts: the "vendor surplus"
represents the benefits the vendor receives from selling a good;
the "consumer surplus" represents the satisfaction the customer
receives from purchasing the good; in combination, the vendor
surplus and consumer surplus represent the total amount of so-
cial welfare generated; the "deadweight loss" triangle represents
the social welfare lost because of the additional cost of taxes im-
posed on the sale of the good, and the "tax revenue" rectangle rep-
resents the amounts of vendor surplus and consumer surplus that
the state claims through the taxes. Tax provisions can also affect
the distribution of social welfare among the members of society
either progressively (redistributing from the better-off to the
worse-off), regressively (redistributing from the worse-off to the
better-off), or proportionally (not redistributing at all).160
preferences. See Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 235 (cited in note 76); Gruber, Public Finance
at 36 (cited in note 57). The income effect is often ignored in social welfare analysis because
the form of tax does not affect the wealth loss from the tax-the loss is inevitable-and
the individual's loss is offset by the public's gain. See Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev
at 62-63 (cited in note 11); Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 235 (cited in note 76). Thus, this
discussion largely does not address the income effect. This is not to say that the income
effect is not important; it may be. See Galle, 67 Tax L Rev at 66-67 (cited in note 76);
Gamage and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 65-69 (cited in note 11).
160 Gruber, Public Finance at 523 (cited in note 57). As an example, take income as a
proxy for social welfare. In a regressive distribution, income is redistributed from low- to
high-income people; as a result of the distribution, high-income people end up with a
greater share of total income than they had before the distribution. Id. In a proportional
distribution, income is not redistributed-each person receives a share of the total income
proportionate to their predistribution share. Id. Finally, in a progressive distribution, income
is redistributed from high-income people to low-income people; after the distribution, low-
income people have a higher share of total income than they had before the distribution. Id.
The federal income tax is an example of a progressive tax. See IRC § 1(a)-(e) (contain-
ing progressive tax rates: as a taxpayer's income increases, so does her tax rate). On the
other hand, state sales taxes are typically regarded as regressive taxes. See Pomp, State
& Local Taxation at 6-15 (cited in note 31). A true flat-rate tax would represent a propor-
tional tax. See Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Struc-
ture: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal L Rev 1905, 1912 (1987). On pure equity
grounds, regressive distributions are typically disfavored; proportional and progressive
distributions each have their advocates. For the iconic article discussing the cases for both
proportional and progressive taxation, see generally Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven Jr,
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U Chi L Rev 417 (1952). For another distin-
guished foray into this topic, see generally Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal L Rev 1905 (cited
in note 160).
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FIGURE 1. SOCIAL WELFARE WITH TAX PROVISIONS
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In general, policymakers should prefer policies that maxim-
ize social welfare and that distribute that welfare in an equitable
manner,161 and this Section is devoted to showing that traditional
incentives and customer-based incentives can generate different
effects on social welfare solely as a result of their different forms.
This is a critical insight because it shows that form matters when
implementing substantive tax policy; a state can improve social
welfare by carefully designing a tax provision. In order to focus
solely on the expected effects on social welfare of the form of the
incentives, this Section relies on two key assumptions. First, it is
assumed that the different forms of targeted economic develop-
ment incentives are equally effective at achieving the goal of
boosting the state's economy by creating jobs, encouraging invest-
ments in infrastructure, and enlarging economic activity.162 That
161 See Nussim, 1 Colum J Tax L at 236 (cited in note 76).
162 This assumption allows the analysis to focus solely on the different effects on social
welfare of the two forms of economic development incentives outside of the state's economic
gains from a business, infrastructure, and employment perspective.
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is to say, a dollar of tax relief provided through a traditional in-
centive will result in the same amount of economic growth as a
dollar of tax relief provided through a customer-based incentive.
A corollary to this assumption is that the two forms of incentives
will bring the same amount of economic detriment to the recipi-
ent's competitors.163 Second, it is assumed that a state providing
targeted economic development incentives will respond in the
same way to its reduced tax revenues regardless of the form which
those incentives take. In other words, to finance the incentives,
the state will cut spending or raise taxes in the same way for tra-
ditional incentives and customer-based incentives. Under these
assumptions, the only remaining relevant consideration is that
traditional incentives deliver tax relief directly to the firm and
customer-based incentives deliver tax relief to the firm's customers.
1. Targeted economic development incentives and social
welfare.
Can targeted economic development incentives increase or
decrease the deadweight loss associated with the taxes they re-
lieve?164 Can they affect the distribution of social welfare? If the
answer to either question is "yes," then policymakers should be
careful when designing their tax provisions in order to most effec-
tively achieve their goals. The answers to the above questions
depend on a number of factors. The first factor is whether one of
the parties is able to control who ultimately receives the tax relief
provided by controlling post-incentive prices.165 As discussed ear-
lier in the Article, it is assumed that a vendor receiving targeted
economic development incentives will have this control.166 If the
vendor controls prices, it could keep them at the pre-incentives
level, capturing the full benefit of the tax relief.167
163 This corollary may prove unrealistic in practice. See note 162.
164 Not all taxes must generate deadweight loss, but those that do not-such as head
taxes or poll taxes-are generally rejected on equity grounds. See Bankman and Griffith,
75 Cal L Rev at 1913, 1920, 1966 (cited in note 160).
165 For purposes of simplicity, it is assumed that the incentives considered relieve recip-
ients of all of the tax that the incentives target. For instance, if considering the customer-
based incentives provided to Amazon, this Section would assume that those incentives
relieve customers of all of the sales taxes on their Amazon purchases, not just a portion of
those taxes.
166 See note 58 and accompanying text.
167 To see this result graphically, return to Figure 1. Assuming the incentives provide
full relief of the taxes imposed, then the tax revenue rectangle represents the tax relief
the incentives offer. If the vendor keeps prices at the pre-incentives level (P2 in Figure 1),
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The second important factor is the elasticity of the supply and
demand curves-how much supply and demand change in re-
sponse to price changes. The more elastic a supply or demand
curve is, the more extreme responses are; a small increase in price
would significantly reduce demand and significantly increase
supply for a highly elastic good.168 Elasticity matters in determin-
ing who bears the burden of a tax; the party with the more elastic
response to price changes will bear less of the tax burden.169 Thus,
if demand for a good is more elastic than supply, consumers bear
less of the tax burden than vendors, as demonstrated graphically
in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. SOCIAL WELFARE WITH MORE ELASTIC DEMAND
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Considering these two factors together, it becomes clear that
targeted economic development incentives can-but will not
then it will retain all of the tax relief, and the tax revenue rectangle will be converted to
vendor surplus.
168 Gruber, Public Finance at 45-46, 554-55 (cited in note 57).
169 See Galle, 65 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 540 (cited in note 94) ("Typically, incidence
depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for the firm's products and inputs.");
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 99 Am Econ Rev at 1169 (cited in note 12) (discussing the effects
of elasticity for the burden of taxes); Slemrod, 61 Natl Tax J at 253 (cited in note 35) (de-
scribing how relative elasticities affect who bears the burden of taxes on labor); Gruber,
Public Finance at 552-56 (cited in note 57).
P2
Pi
20171] 1135
The University of Chicago Law Review
always-affect social welfare. To reach this conclusion, it is im-
portant to recognize that tax relief provided through targeted eco-
nomic incentives does not necessarily result in the elimination of
the deadweight loss created by the taxes. Because the taxes are
still levied generally, market prices should still reflect after-tax
prices. Therefore, the firm can keep prices at after-tax prices, and
the deadweight loss will remain.170 Because of this result, it may
be helpful to think of tax relief as a refund of taxes rather than
the elimination of taxes; for the taxes to be refunded, they must
have been imposed in the first place.
Targeted economic development incentives will have no effect
on the amount of social welfare if it is in the firm's interest to keep
prices at the after-tax, pre-incentives level (price P2 in the Figures);
such incentives will increase social welfare if it is in the firm's
interest to reduce prices to the pretax level (price Pi in the Figures),
sharing the relief with consumers and eliminating the
deadweight loss from the tax.171 To see when these two results
should be expected, a comparison of Figure 1 to Figure 2 is help-
ful. In either case, a firm receiving incentives will recapture the
vendor surplus that had gone to the state as tax revenue; 17 2 the
important consideration is how much consumer surplus is avail-
able in comparison to the additional vendor surplus the firm could
generate by eliminating the deadweight loss. Keeping prices at
the pre-incentives level P2 allows the firm to capture the
consumer surplus that had previously gone to the state as tax rev-
enue; lowering prices to the pretax equilibrium level P1 allows the
firm to generate additional social welfare (and thus vendor sur-
plus) by eliminating deadweight loss, though the firm will not
capture any consumer surplus. In Figure 1, the consumer surplus
going to the state is greater than the vendor surplus eliminated
by the deadweight loss (the lower portion of the deadweight loss
triangle); thus the firm should prefer to keep the pre-incentives
price and capture the consumer surplus that had gone to the state
as tax revenue. The deadweight loss will remain. However,
170 See note 167.
171 Consumers and vendors will likely bear different tax burdens depending on the
taxes under consideration. For example, property tax relief may be borne more heavily by
the firm than sales taxes (that is, the property tax burden may not be passed along to
consumers to the same degree that the sales tax burden is). Thus, the tax a targeted eco-
nomic development incentive relieves may influence whether it is in the firm's interest to
maintain after-tax prices or to return to pretax prices.
172 This is not to say that the firm might not later decide to share that vendor surplus
with its customers by lowering prices.
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Figure 2 demonstrates that as the elasticity of demand increases,
the amount of vendor surplus eliminated by the deadweight loss
grows and the amount of consumer surplus going to the state de-
creases. At some point, the amount of eliminated vendor surplus
will exceed the amount-of consumer surplus captured by the state,
and the firm will prefer to return to the pretax price P1 , eliminating
the deadweight loss and increasing the amount of social welfare.
Targeted economic development incentives can also affect the
distribution of social welfare. When a firm captures all of the tax
relief, there is a redistribution of welfare from consumers to the
firm (that is, the firm captures the consumer surplus that had
previously gone to the state as tax revenue). Whether this distri-
bution is progressive, proportional, or regressive will depend on
the status of the consumers and how the welfare is distributed by
the firm. As a firm is not an individual, the social welfare it cap-
tures will ultimately fall to others, such as owners of the firm
(through increased valuation of the firm), workers at the firm
(through increased compensation), or customers of the firm
(through lower prices).173 If the firm does not capture the tax re-
lief, but instead eliminates the deadweight loss from the original
tax, the distribution of social welfare returns to the pretax bal-
ance. Again, the progressivity, proportionality, or regressivity of
this distribution will depend on the status of the consumers and
how the vendor surplus is distributed by the firm.
Because the discussion has so far assumed that the firm and
consumers are economically rational actors with full awareness
of the incentives provided, there is nothing to indicate that
customer-based incentives and traditional incentives affect social
welfare differently due to their different forms. This result is un-
surprising. Recall that numerous theories have demonstrated
that the initial distribution of rights among parties should not
matter in a rational-actor model; the parties will transact with
each other to reach their preferred balance of rights.174 The form
of targeted economic development incentives should not matter
173 See Galle, 65 NYU Ann Surv Am L at 540 (cited in note 54) ("When a firm is liable
for a judgment, the economic burden of that judgment is ultimately passed on to real peo-
ple, whether they are the firm's owners, its workers, its customers, or even investors in
other businesses."); Rogers, 4 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 109 (cited in note 29) ("[T]ax
abatements shift money from governments to businesses, and that money is then passed
along to consumers, workers and capital owners in the form of wages, lower prices, or
higher capital returns."). See also Gruber, Public Finance at 700 (cited in note 57);
McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1883 (cited in note 6).
174 See note 59.
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under the same assumptions. However, relaxing these assump-
tions exposes how the different forms can be expected to have dif-
ferent effects on social welfare.
2. Customer-based incentives' ability to increase social
welfare.
This Section argues that customer-based incentives are more
likely than traditional incentives to increase social welfare, both
by eliminating deadweight loss and by increasing consumer sur-
plus. These results arise from the restrictions consumer biases
place on firms' ability to control prices and potentially from the
hypersalience to consumers of the tax relief customer-based
incentives offer.
As discussed, maintaining after-tax prices after receiving
customer-based incentives may trigger fairness concerns or loss
aversion in consumers. 175 These results inhibit a firm from alter-
ing its pricing so as to capture the tax relief customer-based in-
centives offer.176 Such concerns and the resulting inhibitions are
not present in the case of traditional incentives.177 Thus, the tax
relief from customer-based incentives is more likely than that
from traditional incentives to be shared with the firm's custom-
ers; external factors pressure the firm into doing so. As the prior
Section detailed, when consumers retain the tax relief, it is as
though the taxes were never imposed-deadweight loss is elimi-
nated, and social welfare is generated. Therefore, the state should
have some preference for customer-based incentives over tradi-
tional incentives.
Additionally, that consumers can, and are likely to, find the
tax relief provided by customer-based incentives hypersalient
may cause customer-based incentives to generate more social wel-
fare than traditional incentives.178 When the tax relief is hyper-
salient, consumers derive more satisfaction from purchasing from
the firm than from other vendors, so the demand curve shifts
up. 179 This shift in demand (which does not occur in the case of the
175 See Parts ILA-B.
176 See note 60. See also text accompanying notes 98-100.
177 See Parts ILA-B.
178 Faulhaber, 92 BU L Rev at 1309 (cited in note 13).
179 See McCaffery, 41 UCLA L Rev at 1884 (cited in note 6) (discussing how the fram-
ing of a tax can generate greater benefits, because of taxpayer biases, by arguing that
repealing the corporate income tax, which is less conspicuous, and replacing it with an
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fully market-salient tax relief from traditional incentives) gener-
ates additional consumer surplus, and thus additional social wel-
fare.180 In other words, a smaller amount of customer-based incen-
tives can achieve the same result as a larger amount of traditional
incentives because customer-based incentives cost the state less.
Figure 3 demonstrates this effect by building on Figure 2, which
shows a situation in which the firm would elect to return prices
to the pretax equilibrium point. However, the potential for in-
creased social welfare as a result of the hypersalience of the tax
relief from customer-based incentives relies heavily on the as-
sumption that traditional incentives and customer-based incen-
tives would burden the recipient's competitors in the same
amount. 81 If customer-based incentives result in more harm to
the recipient's competitors than traditional incentives (as might
happen if customer-based incentives affect the relative demand
for the recipient's products more than traditional incentives), the
net effect on social welfare of customer-based incentives may be
less positive.
equal-revenue but more conspicuous tax would diminish "subjective utility" because of loss
aversion).
180 Also, there should not be an adverse income effect resulting from this shift in de-
mand because the consumers are "purchasing" something they desire-the relief of
taxes-ven if that something should not be desirable from an economically rational point
of view. Even if there were an adverse income effect from overreacting to the tax relief, if
people sacrifice only their lowest-preference transactions as a result of the income effect,
then the net effect on social welfare should be positive. The value of the lost consumption
opportunities for the individual is less than the value of the gains to society. See Gamage
and Shanske, 65 Tax L Rev at 66-68 (cited in note 11) (observing that "[wihen taxes reduce
individuals' budgets, the standard models assume that the individuals optimally allocate
their (now smaller) after-tax budgets across goods and time periods" and arguing that it
should rarely be the case that the impact of the income effect on social welfare outweighs
that of the substitution effect because taxpayers should not be expected to "purchase lux-
ury items before necessities" in most circumstances).
181 See notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
11392017]
The University of Chicago Law Review
FIGURE 3. SOCIAL WELFARE WITH HYPERSALIENT CUSTOMER-
BASED INCENTIVES
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Even so, this Section has presented a number of reasons to sus-
pect that customer-based incentives can generate more social wel-
fare than traditional incentives. Thus, the use of customer-based
incentives should not be dismissed out-of-hand on social-welfare
grounds. So long as customer-based incentives have a better
upside than traditional incentives in this regard, customer-based
incentives should be appealing to states seeking to improve net
social welfare. However, the overall effects on social welfare of
any targeted economic development incentive will ultimately de-
pend on a large number of factors of which the form of the incen-
tive is only one. For instance, though this analysis has assumed
such factors away, 8 2 providing customer-based incentives to cer-
tain concentrated industries may prove particularly harmful to
overall social welfare, as increased demand for one firm permits
182 See note 162 and accompanying text.
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it to push its competitors out of business. A state seeking to im-
prove net social welfare must balance the impact of the choice of
firm with the impact of other such factors.
The following sections take a closer look at two such factors-
the "escape issue" and the "civic virtue issue". These are examined
because they are commonly raised issues regarding the fairness
of traditional incentives. People may derive more satisfaction,
thus generating more social welfare, if the form of incentive se-
lected better addresses these issues than the other does. In other
words, people may be more satisfied when the form of tax provi-
sion selected is viewed as more equitable than other forms. The
following discussion further demonstrates that the two forms can
have different substantive effects and suggests that there are
strong reasons to suspect that customer-based incentives will be
considered more equitable than traditional incentives, improving
their appeal.
B. The Escape Issue
Some critics of traditional incentives argue that the design of
traditional incentives allows the firm to use the tax relief pro-
vided to finance activities in other states or to leave the state be-
fore fulfilling its obligations, causing the benefits of the incentives
to "escape" the state in a way that is unfair to the state's resi-
dents.183 In a sense, the firm using the tax relief to finance outside
activities is merely a bargaining issue; the state should have re-
quired the firm to do more in the state for the incentives if it ex-
pected more. Money is fungible, and the fact that a firm uses tax
relief to finance activities elsewhere does not mean that the firm
did not fund its activities in the state. However, if a firm leaves
the state before fulfilling its obligations, then the escape problem
becomes more legitimate. In any event, a state's citizens may not
be comfortable with the possibility that any state-provided tax re-
lief escapes the state.
As a basic response to the escape issue, many states have
added various clawback provisions to their traditional incentives
offerings which require the firm to return some portion of the
183 See, for example, Daphne A. Kenyon, Adam H. Langley, and Bethany P. Paquin,
Getting the Incentives Right on Tax Incentives, 69 State Tax Notes 783, 786-87 (2013);
Billy Hamilton, Pitching and Hitting: Can State Tax Incentives Be Improved?, 64 State
Tax Notes 915, 919 (2012); Timothy J. Bartik, Eight Issues for Policy toward Economic
Development Incentives, 10 The Region 43, 44 (June 1996).
.1
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incentives if it fails to meet its obligations.184 However, clawback
provisions are rife with issues and have proven somewhat ineffec-
tive.18 As a primary matter, including the provisions decreases
the value of the tax relief to the firm due to the risk that the firm
may have to pay back some of the relief in the future, so more tax
relief may have to be provided.186 Additionally, legal disputes can
arise over whether the provisions apply when a firm leaves the
state, creating costs for both parties and decreasing the likelihood
that the state would be made whole even if it were entitled to be.187
Further, states may be reluctant to include or enforce clawback
provisions because of the message doing so would send to other
firms it hopes to lure in the future. One of the justifications for
offering targeted economic development incentives is to show how
business-friendly the state is; cutting against that display may be
harmful to the state's economic development goals.188
Customer-based incentives are less likely than traditional
incentives to suffer from the escape issue, and thus do not need
the support of awkward clawback provisions. The tax relief pro-
vided through customer-based incentives is directly tied to in-
state activities, and to the extent that the relief is passed through
to customers (as the above analysis indicates is likely), the relief
is less likely to escape the state because individual consumers are
likely to be less mobile than firms. To the extent the tax relief is
184 See Pollard, 11 Hastings Bus L J at 21-22, 26-27 (cited in note 24); Peter D. Enrich,
Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 Urban Law 415, 423 (2002); Scott J. Ziance,
Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 Urban Law 33, 41 (1998).
185 See Enrich, 34 Urban Law at 424-25 (cited in note 184); Ziance, 30 Urban Law at
44-46 (cited in note 184).
186 See Ziance, 30 Urban Law at 46 (cited in note 184).
187 See generally Rubin, 70 NYU L Rev 1277 (cited in note 49) (discussing difficulties
enforcing agreements between firms and governments, including tax incentive agree-
ments). See also Ziance, 30 Urban Law at 44 (cited in note 184) (discussing legal challenges
to enforcing incentive agreements); Pollard, 11 Hastings Bus L J at 21-22 (cited in note 24)
(providing an example of a case dealing with the legal issues arising from the escape prob-
lem and subsequent clawback attempts).
188 See Enrich, 34 Urban Law at 425 (cited in note 184):
[T]he same political dynamics that have fueled the incentive competition over
recent decades are likely to deter enactment and enforcement of [clawback]
measures with real teeth, and, in fact, there is a danger that relatively toothless
accountability measures will merely provide political cover for continued escala-
tion of the interstate subsidy competition.
See also Ziance, 30 Urban Law at 44 (cited in note 184) ("The costs of enforcing incentive
agreements are high. . . . [Clities face even higher costs from the fear of being labeled 'anti-
business."').
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captured by the firm, there may be larger escape concerns; how-
ever, because their tax relief is tied to in-state consumption,
customer-based incentives discourage the firm from ceasing to
engage in economic activity in the state. Finally, because the tax
relief from customer-based incentives is spread out over time (due
to the nature of sales and use taxes), the firm receives no lump-
sum relief as it might through traditional incentives, mitigating
the possibility of a misalignment in favor of the firm between
what the state has paid out and the investments the firm has
made in the state. If anything, the state is paying later for invest-
ments now when it provides customer-based incentives, so there
is little risk of those payments financing activities outside of the
state. Therefore, customer-based incentives appear far more ca-
pable of addressing the escape issue than traditional incentives
and may be preferred by members of the public for that reason.
C. Civic Virtue: The Nonenforcement Issue
The final issue addressed here is the impact of the different
forms of targeted economic development incentives on civic vir-
tue. Civic virtue in this context refers to the willingness of people
to comply with the law. Research demonstrates that such willing-
ness is fostered by the consistent administration of laws that the
public generally views as in line with their values.189 People ex-
press civic virtue when they feel that the law treats them fairly
and equally with respect to everyone else.190 When civic virtue is
eroded, people lose faith in the government and may begin to
189 See Slemrod, 66 FinanzArchiv/Pub Fin Analysis at 22-26 (cited in note 88);
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 Loyola
U Chi L J 253, 273, 287-89 (2009) (discussing the detrimental effects on civic virtue due
to perceptions of unfairness in the law); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence
to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 Loyola U Chi L J 483, 486 (2009) (discussing the influence of
social norms on noncompliance with laws); Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and
Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process, 25 Polit Behav 119, 119-22 (2003) (providing a
survey of research into the effects of procedural justice on perceptions of the legitimacy of
laws); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ J
1043, 1048 (1997) (demonstrating that designing laws suggesting a distrust of citizens
leads to lack of civic virtue).
190 See Slemrod, 66 FinanzArchiv/Pub Fin Analysis at 23 (cited in note 88); Alex
Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109
Colum L Rev 689, 697 (2009); Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 Harv
J Legis 111, 131-32 (2009); Gangl, 25 Polit Behav at 119-22 (cited in note 189); Frey, 107
Econ J at 1052 (cited in note 189); Rosenberg, 16 Va Tax Rev at 202-04 (cited in note 96).
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evade the laws.191 These types of actions are harmful if the laws
are generally welfare enhancing.
Targeted economic development incentives have a built-in
feature that potentially makes them damaging to civic virtue-
they provide benefits to one person at the expense of others. Many
may view this as unfair, and opponents of incentives often point
out the inequity of providing a competitive advantage to one
firm.192 Can the form of targeted tax incentives be expected to mit-
igate or exacerbate this corrosive effect on civic virtue?
Certain aspects of customer-based incentives indicate that
the answer to this question is "yes." Customer-based incentives
may be less corrosive of civic virtue because the tax relief they
offer is theoretically available to the entire public. Each member
of the public can control whether or not she receives that tax relief
(whether the firm then captures it is another question), which
may make the application of the incentives appear more equita-
ble.193 This fact may cause people to be more accepting of
customer-based incentives rather than traditional incentives.
However, there is a meaningful difference between how tra-
ditional incentives and direct customer-based incentives provide
tax relief and how indirect customer-based incentives provide tax
191 See Slemrod, 66 FinanzArchiv/Pub Fin Analysis at 23 (cited in note 88); Leandra
Lederman, The Interplay between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St
L J 1453, 1488 (2003); Kornhauser, 40 Loyola U Chi L J at 288-89 (cited in note 189);
Morse, 40 Loyola U Chi L J at 486 (cited in note 189); Frey, 107 Econ J at 1044, 1049 (cited
in note 189); Rosenberg, 16 Va Tax Rev at 197-98 (cited in note 96). See also generally
Benny Geys and Kai A. Konrad, Patriotism and Taxation (Max Planck Institute for Tax
Law and Public Finance Working Paper No 2016-11, Nov 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/BC9G-J85D (exploring the effects of patriotism on taxpayers' willingness
to comply with tax laws).
192 See, for example, Bill Kidd, Lawmakers Considering Sales Tax Break for Amazon,
60 State Tax Notes 929, 929 (2011) (quoting Eric Bearse, spokesman for the Alliance for
Main Street Fairness, as saying, in an effort to urge lawmakers to reject targeted tax in-
centives for Amazon, that Amazon's attempt to "get special treatment from Texas lawmak-
ers should have every business owner and taxpayer outraged. . . . Texans will not stand
by and let the government give preferential treatment to one out-of-state company that
gives it an advantage over existing Texas businesses"); John Buhl, California Democrats
Speak Out against Proposed Amazon Tax Deal, 2011 State Tax Today 173-2 (Sept 7, 2011)
(quoting California Assembly Speaker John Perez as stating, in opposition to targeted tax
incentives for Amazon, 'This is a matter of simple fairness. . . . Every brick and mortar
store in California must collect and pay sales taxes. That means thousands of small busi-
nesses, as well as large retailers, are shouldering a burden that online retailers like
Amazon have been exempting themselves from, and that's not fair").
193 See Korobkin and Ulen, 88 Cal L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 61) (observing that
people are more optimistic about events if those events are perceived to be within their
control); Jolls, 51 Vand L Rev at 1675 (cited in note 121).
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relief. Traditional incentives and direct customer-based incen-
tives provide tax relief by nontaxation-the law specifically pro-
vides relief of the tax at issue. For instance, a law providing a
direct customer-based incentive would state that sales tax does
not apply to sales by the firm. In contrast, indirect customer-
based incentives provide tax relief by nonenforcement of existing
taxes-by law, the tax is owed, so the state must be complicit in
its failure to enforce the law.194 This complicity in the nonenforce-
ment of existing laws disrupts the consistent application of the
law, and thus indirect customer-based incentives may be more
harmful to civic virtue than traditional incentives and direct
customer-based incentives.195
Thus, the effects of customer-based incentives, and particu-
larly of indirect customer-based incentives, appear more volatile
than those of traditional incentives, which should affect civic vir-
tue only to the extent people think that targeted economic devel-
opment incentives are unfair. However, concerns about the effects
of targeted economic development incentives on civic virtue may
not be that serious in practice. Though traditional incentives are
commonly criticized on equity grounds for favoring one firm over
others, they do not appear to have significantly eroded civic virtue
194 For a discussion of the difference between nontaxation and nonenforcement in the
context of actions by the Internal Revenue Service, see generally Lawrence Zelenak, Cus-
tom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L J 829 (2012).
195 See Thimmesch, 118 W Va L Rev at 177-81 (cited in note 42) (discussing effects
on civic virtue of the nonenforcement of use taxes); Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical
Nonenforcement, 69 Tax L Rev 73, 124-26 (2015) (observing that categorical nonenforce-
ment might lead to less compliance with the law while also providing reasons why such
nonenforcement might not have that effect); Zelenak, 62 Duke L J at 854 (cited in note
194) ("It is a commonplace that nonenforcement (or severe underenforcement) of one law
may breed among the citizenry a general disrespect for the law."). See also Michael
Sant'Ambrogio, The Extra-legislative Veto, 102 Georgetown L J 351, 387-93 (2014) (dis-
cussing the harms resulting from presidential actions designed to not enforce enacted
laws).
Professor Leigh Osofsky makes a compelling case that explicit categorical nonenforce-
ment by an agency can be more legitimate than other forms of nonenforcement in the real
world when administrative resources are not sufficient to fully enforce the law. Osofsky,
69 Tax L Rev at 131-32 (cited in note 195). However, the type of nonenforcement involved
in the provision of customer-based incentives is different; the nonenforcement is not the
result of insufficient resources (though it may certainly help relieve pressure on limited
resources), but it is the result of a state's economic development policy. This difference
may result in more erosion of civic virtue than the "limited resources" approach to non-
enforcement, as Osofsky observes while taking issue with the line between the two forms
of nonenforcement for purposes of constitutional analysis. Id at 115-24 (addressing con-
cerns about categorical nonenforcement arising from policy-based decisions and the effect
of categorical nonenforcement on the rule of law).
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to the point that they cause taxpayers to evade states' laws.196 As
direct customer-based incentives similarly involve nontaxation,
fears of their potential to erode civic virtue should be tempered.
Additionally, states have engaged in the nonenforcement of sales
taxes on Internet purchases for some time,197 with no apparent
significant erosion of civic virtue outside of that specific scenario.198
Therefore, nonenforcement resulting from indirect customer-based
incentives may also fail to significantly erode civic virtue gener-
ally. However, further research is required on this issue. States
have typically demonstrated some desire to collect sales taxes on
Internet purchases, at least outwardly showing a commitment to
enforcement.199 This display may temper the effects of nonenforce-
ment on civic virtue; the complicity involved in indirect customer-
based incentives may be a more powerful eroding force.200
D. The Policy Appeal of Customer-Based Incentives
Though any number of additional factors influencing the ef-
fect on social welfare of targeted economic development incentives
could be considered, this Part has argued that there are a number
of reasons to support customer-based incentives as a policy mat-
ter. States appear locked into competition for mobile firms and
the benefits they bring.201 Traditionally, the states have relied on
direct spending in the form of traditional incentives to lure these
firms into their states. 202 However, customer-based incentives ap-
pear to have the potential to be more effective at attracting these
firms while at the same time better supporting the state's welfare,
and thus should be taken seriously as a policy option.
196 See Allison Christians, Avoidance, Evasion, and Taxpayer Morality, 44 Wash U J
L & Pol 39, 47 (2014); Zelinsky, 58 Case W Reserve L Rev at 1150-51 (cited in note 156)
(suggesting that nonfavored firms may retaliate to tax incentives by "demand[ing] the
same relief granted to others" or "threatening to depart"); Smith, 17 J State Taxn at 4
(cited in note 7) ("Wax incentives ... are inequitable because they favor manufacturing
and mobile businesses that can threaten to relocate.").
197 See notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
198 But see Thimmesch, 118 W Va L Rev at 160-83 (cited in note 42) (discussing the
various long-term harms that might result from the nonenforcement of use taxes).
199 See id at 158-60 (detailing states' efforts to enforce use tax compliance). See also
note 45.
200 See Osofsky, 69 Tax L Rev at 97-98 (cited in note 195) (observing how the public
exposure of categorical nonenforcement can result in action against such nonenforcement,
using the example of low partnership audit rates by the Internal Revenue Service, or may
increase the legitimacy of the nonenforcement by spurring public debate over its merits).
201 See text accompanying note 29.
202 See text accompanying note 26.
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In a way, customer-based incentives can be thought of as not
being about tax relief for a firm at all; rather, they are about cre-
ating a motivated customer base for the firm in order to encourage
it to invest in the state. Many argue that targeted traditional in-
centives are ineffective at influencing mobile firms' business loca-
tion decisions because so many other factors, such as the presence
of natural resources, an educated workforce, and good infrastruc-
ture, are more important.203 Just as natural resources are im-
portant to a manufacturer, a motivated customer base may be
important to a firm; customer-based incentives provide consumers
with that motivation. By understanding customer-based incen-
tives better, states may be able to better direct their economic de-
velopment efforts. At a minimum, state policymakers must pay
attention to the effects consumer biases can have on the substan-
tive consequences of their tax provisions.
CONCLUSION
Customer-based incentives are an innovative, if somewhat pe-
culiar, way to provide firms with targeted economic development
incentives. However, this Article has demonstrated that, despite
their peculiarity, customer-based incentives may be better suited
than traditional incentives to achieve the substantive goals of
states attempting to lure mobile firms. Not only do customer-
based incentives have the potential to be more effective and to
generate more social welfare than traditional incentives, they also
appear better able to address equitable issues that traditional in-
centives face. As firms and states come to better understand
customer-based incentives, their use should be expected to grow.
Taking a step back, these conclusions indicate that the form
of tax provisions can have significant substantive effects, provid-
ing policymakers with opportunities to improve the effectiveness
of tax provisions, particularly tax relief provisions. The lessons of
behavioral research suggest that tax relief is most effective when
it affects-even only nominally-a larger number of taxpayers,
even if the substantive policy behind the relief is to influence only
a small number of taxpayers. Additionally, nominally spreading
tax relief among a broader population may appear more equitable
203 See Schaefer, 28 NM L Rev at 309-10 (cited in note 27); Rauser, 8 State & Local
Tax Law at 113 (cited in note 156); Key and Smith, 15 J State Taxn at 6 (cited in note 27);
Benedicte E.F. Mathijsen, Enterprise Zones as Tools of Urban Industrial Policy, 6 Mich
Yearbook Intl Legal Stud 233, 249 (1984).
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to people, particularly when the people perceive they have some
control over receiving the tax relief. Some may prefer to hide their
taxes 204 but keep their tax relief in plain sight.
204 See Schenk, 28 Yale J Reg at 284 (cited in note 11); McCaffery and Baron, 52
UCLA L Rev at 1762 (cited in note 89).
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